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THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION AND
CHARTER SCHOOLS: A GENERAL AND UNIFORM
PROHIBITION?
Asti Gallina*
Abstract: In its 2015 opinion in Washington League of Women Voters v. State, the
Washington State Supreme Court invalidated Initiative 1240—which authorized the creation
of charter schools. The Court considered two issues on appeal: (1) that the charter schools
unconstitutionally diverted common school funds to non-common schools; and (2) that the
charter schools violated article IX, section 2 requiring the legislature to establish a “general
and uniform system of common schools.” The Court resolved the case on the common school
fund issue and did not reach the “general and uniform” challenge. In its slip opinion, the
Court had included a footnote explaining that the charter schools under Initiative 1240 also
violated the uniformity of the common school system. After denying the State’s petition for
reconsideration, the Court issued an amended opinion omitting the footnote. Thus, the import
of the article IX uniformity mandate on charter schools remains unsettled.
In response to the Court’s opinion in League of Women Voters invalidating Initiative
1240, the Washington State Legislature passed the Charter Public School Act (the CPSA).
The CPSA establishes a system of charter schools outside the common school system.
Because the Washington State Supreme Court has not yet considered a challenge to charter
schools under the article IX “general and uniform mandate,” it is unclear whether charter
schools—which are relatively free from regulation and focused on providing alternative and
varied learning experiences—can fit within a general and uniform system of public schools.
This Comment argues that the uniformity requirement in article IX, section 2 of the
Washington State Constitution requires the legislature to establish a uniform system of laws
by which the public schools are administered. Although cases interpreting the article IX
uniformity mandate emphasize the substantive uniformity of the schools themselves, the text
of the Constitution, the structure of the public school system, and interpretations advanced in
other contexts support a procedure-based interpretation. Because a procedurally uniform
system does not necessarily require identical schools, this Comment argues that the charter
school system established under the CPSA fits within the general and uniform system of
public schools.

INTRODUCTION
Article IX of the Washington State Constitution requires the
legislature to fund “a general and uniform system of public schools.”1
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Special thanks to Hugh Spitzer
for his insightful critiques and guidance and to the members of Washington Law Review for their
support throughout. The author is a Teach for America alumnus and taught at a charter school from
2012–2014.
1. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
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That system must include “common schools, and such high schools,
normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established.”2
In 2012, Washington State voters passed Initiative Measure 1240 (I1240), authorizing the creation of up to forty charter schools.3 The
Initiative defined charter schools as common schools and provided that
charter schools would be funded to the same extent, and with the same
sources of funding, as other common schools.4 In September 2015, the
Washington State Supreme Court declared I-1240 unconstitutional in
League of Women Voters of Washington v. State (League of Women
Voters).5 The Court held that charter schools under I-1240 were not
common schools because they were not subject to local voter control.6
As a result, the Court concluded charter schools could not receive certain
funds restricted for the exclusive use of common schools.7 Because the
decision effectively deprived charter schools of funding, the Court held
the provision was not severable and invalidated the entire Initiative.8
Opponents of Initiative 1240 challenged the law based on two distinct
arguments. They argued that charter schools were not common schools
and that the charter schools broke with the uniformity of the common
school system.9 Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the
King County Superior Court held that these schools satisfied the
constitutional uniformity requirement, but did not qualify as common
schools because of the lack of voter control.10 The Court held that the
funding provision was severable, however, and did not invalidate the
Initiative in its entirety.11
The Washington State Supreme Court heard the case on direct
review.12 Because it concluded that the funding provisions were not
2. Id.
3. Wash. Initiative Measure No. 1240 (approved Nov. 6, 2012), https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/
osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2012/General-Election/Documents/I-1240_complete
_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJ4N-FYYH] (codified in various sections of WASH. REV. CODE § 28A
(2014)); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.
4. Initiative Measure No. 1240, §§ 202(1), 215(1), 220, 223(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 28A.710.020(1), 28A.710.150(1), 28A.710.220, 28A.710.230(1)).
5. 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015) (originally published Sept. 4, 2015).
6. Id. at 404, 355 P.3d at 1137.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 410, 355 P.3d at 1140.
9. Trial Order, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 13-2-24977-4 SEA (Wash.
Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013), 2013 WL 11109512.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 397, 355 P.3d at 1133.
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severable, it did not go on to address the uniformity arguments advanced
by the plaintiffs.13 However, in its original opinion, the majority
included a footnote suggesting that the charter legislation would also
violate the constitutional requirement of a general and uniform system. 14
The majority later issued an amended opinion in which it omitted the
footnote, deferring the question to a later date.15 By doing so, the Court
left to another day the question whether charter schools can satisfy the
constitutional requirement for a general and uniform system.16
The Court issued its opinion the day before hundreds of students were
set to begin the new school year, causing widespread confusion and
uncertainty.17 In following months, students, teachers and lawyers
scrambled to make sense of the ruling.18 Some politicians and judicial
candidates denounced the Court’s decision.19 During the 2016 legislative
session, the Washington State Legislature passed new charter legislation,
known as the Charter Public School Act (CPSA), in an effort to keep the

13. Id.
14. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11 n.10 (Wash. Sept. 4,
2015) (“[T]he absence of local control by voters would also violate the article IX uniformity
requirement.”)
15. Order Changing Opinion and Denying Further Reconsideration, League of Women Voters of
Wash., 184 Wash.2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (No. 89714-0).
16. See Complaint, El Centro de la Raza v. State, No. 16-2-18527-4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 16,
2016) (“Plaintiffs seek to protect the interests relating to the education of children across the state
and, in particular, their judicially enforceable right to have the State amply provide them with an
education and establish a general and uniform system of public schools.”).
17. See, e.g., Emma Brown, What Makes a Public School Public? Washington State Court Finds
Charter Schools Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/what-makes-a-public-school-public-washington-state-court-finds-charter-schools-un
constitutional/2015/09/08/706975c8-5632-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html [https://perma.cc/
GCM6-CBSE] (“[T]he future is uncertain for the state’s nine charter schools and the 1,200 students
who attend them.”); Gene Johnson, State’s Charter Schools to Stay Open Despite High Court
Ruling, KOMO NEWS (Sept. 8, 2015), http://komonews.com/news/local/states-charter-schools-tostay-open-despite-high-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/APP4-UFUT] (describing Charter School
Association’s commitment to keep charter schools open for the remainder of the school year despite
unclear funding sources).
18. Updated: WA Charters Statement on Yesterday’s State Supreme Court Ruling, WA
CHARTERS (Sept. 5, 2015), http://wacharters.org/updated-wa-charters-statement-on-yesterdaysstate-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/G2UB-QYSA] (“Along with legal experts, we are
carefully reviewing the decision to determine how this ruling will be applied. Until we know more,
every public charter school plans to be open on Tuesday, September 8, and we will do everything in
our power to ensure that there is no disruption for the students currently enrolled in Washington’s
public charter schools.”).
19. Former Gov. Gregoire on the State Supreme Court Ruling, WA CHARTERS (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://wacharters.org/former-gov-gregoire-on-the-state-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/B5TM UVRE].
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doors to Washington’s charter schools open.20 The CPSA defines charter
schools as public schools operating outside of the common school
system.21 Because they operate outside the common school system,
charter schools are not subject to the same stringent standards articulated
by the Court to qualify as common schools.22 However, the schools must
still fit within the constitutional requirement for a “general and uniform”
system of public schools.23
The language requiring a “general and uniform” system of public
schools was present in the original constitution ratified by the citizens of
Washington in 1889.24 Since then, the Court has had few opportunities to
define its scope.25 The bounds of the constitutional mandate, therefore,
remain unclear. How much variation between individual schools does
the Constitution permit while still maintaining a general and uniform
system?26 Must all schools within the public school system be uniform,
or is uniformity required only within each class of schools?27 In light of
this constitutional ambiguity, how should the Court interpret the general
and uniform requirement?28 Is there a place for charter schools within a
general and uniform system?29 This Comment explores each of these
questions and attempts to advance an interpretation of the “general and
uniform” requirement that both (1) reflects the framer’s original intent
and (2) allows for public schools that can adapt and accommodate
students with diverse needs.

20. Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207.
21. League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 404, 355 P.3d 1131,
1137 (2015).
22. See infra section IV.A.
23. WASH. CONST. art. IX § 2.
24. Id.
25. See infra section III.A.
26. Cf. L.K. Beale, Charter Schools, Common Schools, and the Washington State Constitution, 72
WASH. L. REV. 535, 551–53 (1997) (discussing the ambiguity of the language in art. IX, § 2);
Education—Charter Schools—Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State
Constitution—League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), 129
HARV. L. REV. 1811 (2016) [hereinafter Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act
Violates State Constitution] (noting the Court left issues of uniformity unresolved in its opinion in
League of Women Voters).
27. Cf. Beale, supra note 26; Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State
Constitution, supra note 26.
28. Cf. Beale, supra note 26; Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State
Constitution, supra note 26.
29. Cf. Beale, supra note 26; Washington Supreme Court Holds Charter School Act Violates State
Constitution, supra note 26.
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Part I will discuss the history and ideology of both the common
school and charter school movements. Part II will survey the major cases
and legislation influencing charter schools in Washington State. Part III
will examine the scope of article IX, section 4 of the Washington State
Constitution, including its plain meaning, contemporaneous
interpretations, case law, and modern practice and usage to inform the
scope of the “general and uniform” mandate. This Comment will then
argue that the mandate requires a “general” system of schools that is free
and open to all. In addition, the legislature must maintain procedural
uniformity in the operation of the law by prescribing a consistent set of
procedures governing educational outcomes, administrative oversight,
and funding. Finally, Part IV will examine whether the legislature’s new
charter legislation satisfies the general and uniform mandate using the
procedure-based interpretation advanced in Part III. This Comment
concludes by arguing that the CPSA provides sufficient procedural
uniformity in the establishment, administration and oversight of charter
schools to survive a constitutional challenge on general and uniform
grounds.
I.

THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE COMMON SCHOOL AND
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENTS INFORM THE MODERN
LEGAL DEBATE

The challenges levied against charter schools in Washington State
reflect the inherent tension between the charter school and common
school models.30 The common school movement emerged in the 1830s
as a response to the widely varying access to education for students
throughout the country.31 Focused on providing all students with a
quality education, the movement emphasized equality and uniformity as
a means to provide students with equal access to education regardless of
income or location.32 Over time, however, education activists began to
question the common school movement’s one-size-fits-all approach to
education.33 The charter school movement emerged as one solution to
the perceived need for alternative educational paradigms. 34 Like the
30. See generally League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131
(2015); Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909).
31. CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY,
1780–1860, at 5–7 (1983).
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., DANNY WEIL, CHARTER SCHOOLS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 12–14 (2000)
(discussing various public school reform movements).
34. See id.
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common school movement, the charter school movement focuses on
increasing student access to quality education.35 However, the charter
school movement emphasizes individual choice and market forces as
means to improve education.36 Charter school proponents believe that
freeing schools to pursue diverse educational opportunities will allow
parents and students to identify successful schools and permit the state to
discontinue unsuccessful models.37 The Washington State Supreme
Court’s decision in League of Women Voters drew heavily on concepts
from the common school movement entrenched in the Washington
Constitution to invalidate Initiative 1240.38 An overview of the two
movements thus provides context for the larger debate over charter
schools and informs the legal arguments on either side.
A.

The Common School Movement’s Emphasis on Uniformity
Influenced Many State Constitutions and Education Laws

Common schools are public schools that provide a basic K–12
education. Three primary features characterize common schools: (1) the
schools are open to all students of eligible age and are free to attend; (2)
teachers maintain state-issued certifications; and (3) the schools are
subject to the control of locally-elected board members.39 Because the
common school movement influenced modern education, the
movement’s origins inform the current legal landscape for schools in
Washington40 and nationwide.41
The common school movement emerged as a reform effort in
response to the meager (and widely varying) access to education for
students of different social classes and localities.42 Early American
education was neither compulsory nor available to all students.43
Deriving from the traditions of Colonial America, parents, churches, and
35. See JOSEPH MURPHY & CATHERINE DUNN SHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 22 (2002).
36. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 119–20.
37. See id.
38. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 405, 355 P.3d 1131, 1137
(2015).
39. Cf. Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane County v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909).
40. See League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 404, 355 P.3d at 1137 (discussing the features
of a common school).
41. See JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL: FROM THE PURITANS TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
102 (7th ed. 2008).
42. See id. at 78–79.
43. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 12 (1977).
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municipalities organized early schools.44 Funding, teacher education,
and curricula varied widely by location.45 For example, the
Massachusetts General School Law of 1647 required towns of more than
fifty households to provide a teacher to instruct the children to read and
write; the law required larger towns to establish a school.46 By contrast,
the schools in other states typically comprised an un-unified system of
private-pay schools and charity schools.47 While most charity schools
originated as church-run institutions for the education of indigent
students, many charity schools eventually secured funding from city and
state governments.48
Following the American Revolution, the concept of formal education
gained popularity.49 In 1779, Thomas Jefferson published A Bill for the
More General Diffusion of Knowledge.50 Jefferson advocated for
schoolhouses in every county that would provide at least three years of
instruction in reading, writing, common math, and with an emphasis on
classical history.51 Unlike many of his peers, Jefferson did not believe
schools should provide religious or political instruction.52 Noah Webster,
on the other hand, viewed public schooling as a means to instill common
moral and social values in young students.53 Although the neutral
ideology advanced by Jefferson prevailed, Webster made a lasting
contribution in American education through the series of schoolbooks he
developed, which gained widespread popularity throughout early
common schools.54
The common school movement took shape in the 1830s and 1840s
when school reformers put into place the educational ideas advanced by

44. KAESTLE, supra note 31, at 3.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Old Deluder Act (1647), MASS. GOV., http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/lawlib/docs/delu
dersatan.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PMT-YDY7].
47. KAESTLE, supra note 31, at 3–4.
48. Id. at 6.
49. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783–1876, at
5 (1980). See also Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, in ESSAYS ON
EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 9, 9–23 (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965).
50. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779), reprinted in
THE SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 20 (James W. Fraser ed., 2d ed.
2001).
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 23–24.
53. KAESTLE, supra note 31, at 5–6.
54. Id.
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earlier generations.55 Like Noah Webster, common school reformers
advocated education as a way to reduce tensions between social classes,
instill shared moral and civic values, and ensure an informed and
capable citizenry fit to carry on the republican form of government.56
Common schools differed from previous schools in several respects.
First, the movement advocated educating students in a common
schoolhouse.57 Reformers believed that by educating different groups of
children together, hostilities and tensions between different groups
would abate.58 Second, the schools sought to teach government policymaking and nationalism.59 This was a particularly important goal prior to
the civil war because views on American citizenship differed sharply.60
A third feature of the movement was its role in influencing state
legislatures to create agencies to oversee education.61 Although many
states enacted laws requiring counties to provide for local education, the
lack of centralized oversight continued the phenomenon of widely
varying access to education.62 These three features formed the basis for
many of the modern goals of education.63 The belief that human nature is
malleable and that morality and civic duty can be taught remains central
to education theory today.64
Two of the most influential figures in advancing the early common
school movement were Horace Mann and Henry Barnard.65 Between the
1820s and 1850s, Mann and Barnard edited periodicals devoted to
education and authored influential works regarding the necessity and

55. SPRING, supra note 41, at 78.
56. See Horace Mann, Tenth Annual Report, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN
ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 62–63 (Lawrence Cremin ed., 1957).
57. SPRING, supra note 41, at 79.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. See also Common School Movement—Colonial and Republican Schooling, Changes in the
Antebellum Era, the Rise of the Common School, EDUC. ENCYCLOPEDIA, STATEUNIVERSITY.COM,
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1871/Common-School-Movement.html
[https://perma.cc/RR2B-NU6C].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Stefanie Sanford, Making Americans: Civic Education and the Common Core,
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://edexcellence.net/commentary/educationgadfly-daily/common-core-watch/making-americans-civic-education-and-the-common
[https://perma.cc/U4GK-BTXS] (advocating education as a primary tool in the creation of civicminded citizens).
65. SPRING, supra note 41, at 80–81.
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purposes of common schools.66 During this same time, two important
shifts were taking place in American society: the abolition of property
requirements for suffrage and the widening disparity between social
classes as a result of industrialization.67 Seizing on the uncertain political
atmosphere, Mann argued that schools must educate children on the
importance of using the vote rather than violence to effect political
change.68
As the common school movement gained traction, it gained
popularity with political groups that advocated common schools as a
means of furthering policy goals. Many advocates for common schools
were members of the newly-formed Whig party who believed that the
government should intervene to provide services such as a free public
education to society.69 The Jacksonian Democrats—the other major
political party at the time—opposed the common school movement,
arguing that social order would naturally emerge, and instead supported
a system of locally-controlled schools.70 Industrialization gave rise to
additional education-based concerns, and the Workingmen’s party
emerged with educational demands.71 The Workingmen’s party, which
gained influence in the Eastern states in the late 1820s, advocated
education as a means to protect individual rights.72
As the common school movement took hold, many states began to
codify a right to education either in their state constitutions or legislation
creating an affirmative right to education.73 Legislation from this time
66. Id. at 81.
67. See WAYNE J. URBAN & JENNINGS L. WAGONER, JR., AMERICAN EDUCATION: A HISTORY 90
(5th ed. 2014). Notably, in the southern states, most slaves had no access to formal education and
opportunities for free blacks were limited. See, e.g. Slave Code of South Carolina, DUHAIME,
http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-1503/1740-Slave-Code-of-South-CarolinaArticles-44-49.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZAB9-9VLD] (imposing a fine on individuals who educate
slaves).
68. See Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE
MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 93 (Lawrence Cremin ed., 1957) (“Had the obligations of
the future citizen been sedulously inculcated upon all the children of this Republic, would the
patriot have had to mourn over so many instances, where the voter, not being able to accomplish his
purpose by voting, has proceeded to accomplish it by violence . . . .”).
69. Mark Groen, The Whig Party and the Rise of Common Schools, 1837–1854: Party and Policy
Reexamined, 35 AM. EDUC. HIST. J. 251, 252 (2008).
70. SPRING, supra note 41, at 92.
71. Id. at 89–90.
72. See id. at 90 (quoting an editorial in The Workingmen’s Advocate from 1830 arguing, “The
right of self government implies a right to a knowledge necessary to the exercise of the right of self
government. If all have an equal right to the first, all must consequently have an equal right to the
second; therefore, all are entitled to equal compensation.”) (citation omitted).
73. See SPRING, supra note 41, at 92.
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strongly reflects common school influences.74 For example, the Enabling
Act admitting North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington to
the Union specifically designated federal land grants “for the use and
benefit of the common schools” of the states.75 Likewise, the
constitutions of many western states chartered in the mid-1800s include
language referring specifically to common schools.76 This is significant
because it reveals the extent to which the values of the common school
movement shaped the landscape of education law.
As demonstrated by the conflict between the Whigs and the
Jacksonian-Democrats, the success of the common school movement
could be viewed, at least in part, as a triumph of one political ideology
over another. Common schools enforce uniformity through centralized
governmental control to achieve educational equality.77
B.

The Charter School Movement Advocated Education Reforms that
Allowed for Variation and Individualization

A public charter school is a publicly funded school typically governed
by a group or organization under a contract, known as a charter.78
Schools can be independent single-site schools or operate as part of a
network run by a central managing organization.79 Either nonprofit
organization or for-profit management organizations may operate charter
schools, depending on the state legislation.80 The charter exempts the
school from certain state or local regulations. This exemption provides
the school with greater autonomy to educate its students.81 In exchange

74. See, e.g., Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) (providing funds
specifically for the benefit of common schools). The tradition of dedicating public lands for
education dates all the way back to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See Northwest Ordinance,
OUR DOCUMENTS, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=8 [https://perma.
cc/VW8M-3KNP].
75. Id. at 682.
76. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1889); IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 12 (1857); NEV. CONST. art.
11, § 2 (1864); N.D. CONST. art X, § 24 (1889); WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (1889).
77. See SPRING, supra note 41, at 93.
78. Fast Facts: Charter Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 [https://perma.cc/BME3-ZB5G].
79. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CHARTER SCHOOL
MOVEMENT 2 (2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/New-Closed2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4BU-2ZCP].
80. See id. A survey of charter schools operating throughout the nation during the 2015–16 school
year found that 15% of charter schools were operated by education management organizations, 26%
were operated by charter management organizations, and 59% were independently operated.
81. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 6–7.
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for this flexibility, the charter school must perform in accordance with
the accountability measures prescribed by its charter.82
At the end of the contract term, the charter authorizing entity can
either renew or terminate the school’s charter.83 Authorizers should base
this decision on how well the school adhered to its charter contract and
the outcomes it achieved for schools.84 In this way, charter schools
engage in a tradeoff: greater autonomy in exchange for strict
accountability.85 Rather than complying with the numerous statepromulgated rules and regulations that govern district schools, charter
schools are relatively free to experiment.86 Proponents of charter schools
argue that this pressure to perform will motivate the schools to use their
autonomy to improve educational outcomes for students.87
Charter schools are not the first attempt to decentralize schools and
work around the regulations and bureaucracy perceived to stifle
innovation in public schools.88 Innovative schools, magnet schools, and
alternative schools appeared before the charter school model for school
reform.89 Innovative schools were district-based schools utilizing
experimental curricula and instructional techniques.90 These schools
were different because they directly incorporated input from teachers,
parents, and community members.91 Magnet schools emerged in the
1970s as a way to attract diverse parents and students through additional
funding and specialized curriculum and instruction.92 Charter school
proponents identified their model as a means to serve students who were

82. See id. at 6.
83. See id. at 7.
84. Marc Dean Millot, Autonomy, Accountability, and the Values of Public Education, CTR. ON
REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. 8 (1996), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/ pub_crpe_aavpe_
dec96_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/99VM-WJRP].
85. See MURHPY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, at 52–53.
86. See id.
87. See id. Importantly, this theory is valid only if authorizers actually enforce performance
requirements under the charter contract.
88. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 7–9, 33.
89. See JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICAN
EDUCATION 5–10 (1996).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. WEIL, supra note 33, at 7–9. See also What are Magnet Schools?, MAGNET SCHS. OF AM.,
http://www.magnet.edu/about/what-are-magnet-schools [https://perma.cc/J6QH-28SM]. Magnet
schools were also used as desegregation incentives. Id.
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not succeeding in traditional school settings, such as students with a
pattern of behavioral problems or students at risk of dropping out.93
Ray Budde and Albert Shanker are generally credited with developing
the charter school concept throughout the 1980s.94 Ray Budde, a New
England educator, first coined the term “charter school” in his 1974
paper presented to the Society for General Systems Research titled
Education by Charter: Restructuring School Districts.95 Budde’s model
envisioned chartering academic departments or programs rather than
entire schools.96 He believed that successful charter departments could
then serve as models for larger school or district-wide reform.97 Budde’s
vision gained substantial momentum after another education reformer,
Al Shanker, presented the charter model during a National Press Club
speech.98 Shanker and the American Federation of Teachers saw charter
schools as a vehicle to address the eighty percent of students who were,
they said, not adequately served by traditional district schools.99 In
contrast with Budde, Shanker advocated chartering entire schools rather
than departments or programs.100 Under Shanker’s framework, teachers
unions would work together with school boards to review charter school
proposals.101 Teachers would be given the same resources as teachers in
traditional district schools.102 Shanker and Budde both advocated
allowing charter schools to demonstrate results over defined periods of
time.103
In 1991, Minnesota passed the nation’s first charter school statute.104
The legislation provided for the establishment of up to eight charter

93. WEIL, supra note 33, at 33–34. See generally RICHARD NEUMANN, SIXTIES LEGACY: A
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS MOVEMENT, 1967–2001 (2003).
94. NATHAN, supra note 89, at 62–63.
95. See Ray Budde, Education by Charter, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 518, 518–20 (1989).
96. Id. at 519.
97. Id.
98. NATHAN, supra note 89, at 62–63.
99. See Albert Shanker, Charter Schools: Open for Other 80 Percent, 45 SCH. ADMIN. 72, 72
(1988).
100. Reynaldo Contreras, The Charter School Movement in California and Elsewhere, 27 EDUC.
& URB. SOC’Y 213, 215 (1995).
101. Albert Shanker, Restructuring Our Schools, 65 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 88, 98 (1988).
102. Id.
103. See Budde, supra note 95, at 519 (proposing charter terms of three to five years); Shanker,
supra note 99 (proposing charter terms of five to ten years).
104. 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 265, art. 9, § 3; see also MURPHY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35,
at 27.
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schools throughout the state.105 The schools were free from most state
and local education regulations except mandatory teaching certification
requirements.106 The law permitted both the local school board and the
state school board to authorize charter schools.107 The law provided that
each charter school would have a board, comprised primarily of
teachers.108 Subsequent amendments to the law removed the
requirements for local school board approval.109 The legislature also
repealed the cap on charter schools, allowing an unlimited number of
charter schools.110 In addition, the state authorized public and private
four-year and community colleges to sponsor charter schools.111
Since the Minnesota legislation passed in 1991, the number of charter
schools has grown rapidly.112 In 1999, approximately 350,000 students
throughout the nation attended charter schools.113 Due to the
proliferation of charter school legislation throughout the 1990s, that
number increased to roughly 3.5 million students by 2015.114 As of
December 2016, forty-two states have passed legislation providing for
the establishment of charter schools.115 Additionally, states continue to
amend and expand existing charter school policies. As of December
2016, states have considered 218 bills amending or expanding existing
charter school finance legislation.116
Charter school proponents argue that the choice charter schools
provide to parents to opt for an alternative educational experience for

105. MURPHY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, at 28.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. THOMAS L. GOOD, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: CHOICE, VOUCHERS, AND CHARTERS, ch.
5 (2009) (ebook).
113. Id.
114. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS
& STUDENTS, 2014–2015,
at
1 (Feb.
2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/open_closed_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W7K-WP69].
115. The Last Eight States Without Charter Laws, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM (2016),
https://www.edreform.com/2013/01/the-last-eight-states-without-charter-school-laws/
[https://perma.cc/UCE2-786G].
116. State Legislation—Choice of Schools—Charter Schools—Finance, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE
STS., http://b5.caspio.com/dp.asp?AppKey=b7f93000695b3d0d5abb4b68bd14&id=a0y70000000
Cbm6AAC [https://perma.cc/Z79G-W66A].
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their children increases educational quality in all schools.117 Following
this logic, school choice benefits even students who do not attend charter
schools because traditional schools must provide better academic
programs to compete for students.118 Moreover, charter schools can
serve as small-scale laboratories for experiments in educational
innovation.119 By allowing teachers and administrators greater autonomy
to experiment, charter schools put the decision-making power in the
hands of experts rather than politicians.120
Opponents of charter schools criticize public school privatization.121
Because many states’ charter school laws permit for-profit companies to
sponsor charter schools, education management organizations and
charter management organizations have emerged to run charter schools
for a profit.122 Another common objection to charter schools focuses on
the lack of measurable results.123 Over twenty years after the first charter
schools opened in Minnesota, studies measuring the effectiveness of
charter schools are still wholly inconclusive.124 Further, charter school
opponents often criticize charter schools for the use of “weed out” or
“skimming” techniques, which are policies and tactics used by schools
to selectively shape the school’s student body.125 This practice not only

117. See, e.g., NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., SEPARATING FACT & FICTION: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS 11 (2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/Separating-Fact-from-Fiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB79-4VLW] (describing reasons
parents value school choice options).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., SPRING, supra note 41, at 474–79 (characterizing charter schools as part of the
school privatization movement); Valerie Strauss, A Primer on the Damaging Movement to Privatize
Public Schools, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2016/01/07/a-primer-on-the-damaging-movement-to-privatize-public-schools/
[https://perma.cc/JTN2-EMUB] (characterizing the charter school movement as an outgrowth of
private corporate interests).
122. Marian Wang, When Charter Schools Are Nonprofit in Name Only, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 9,
2014, 10:49 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-charter-schools-are-nonprofit-in-nameonly [https://perma.cc/QEP2-HSVF].
123. Charter Schools: Finding Out the Facts: At a Glance, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC.,
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Organizing-a-school/Charter-schoolsFinding-out-the-facts-At-a-glance [https://perma.cc/8BG7-UJAF] (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
124. See id.; CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 24 (2013), https://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20
Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/2636-BC9W].
125. Stephanie Simon, Special Report: Class Struggle—How Charter Schools Get Students They
Want, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2013, 8:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chartersadmissions-idUSBRE91E0HF20130216 [https://perma.cc/CFE7-YYVH]. But see Charter Schools
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artificially inflates performance indicators, but also contributes to school
segregation because students that are not admitted to charter schools
return to their local district schools.126 Finally, the high-stakes
accountability measures in place for charters make them more likely to
close than district counterparts.127 Charter school opponents fear these
frequent school closures may result in a transient educational landscape
in already-disadvantaged areas.128
Despite inconclusive outcomes, charter schools remain a popular tool
in the school reform movement.129 Perhaps because of the immense
variation inherent in the charter school model, the effectiveness of
specific school models and curricular techniques may not become
apparent for many years to come.130 Nonetheless, what charter schools
lack in definitive statistics, they make up for in popularity.131 Although
the public opinion is far from settled on the effectiveness and desirability
of charter schools as an alternative to traditional district schools,132 their
national proliferation suggests the charter school model will continue to
be a feature of the school reform movement for the foreseeable future.
II.

WASHINGTON STATE’S TURBULENT ROAD TO CHARTER
SCHOOLS

A.

Common Schools in Washington State

In Washington State, the influence of the common school
movement’s ideals is evident in the text of the state Constitution and in
early education laws. The Washington State Constitution, ratified in
1889, contains a provision specifically directing the legislature to
provide for a system of common schools.133 Likewise, passing
legislation establishing a common school system was one of the

Aren’t Creaming the Best Students, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/
2013/02/charter-schools-arent-creaming-the-best-students/ [https://perma.cc/H8GQ-K7UX].
126. See Simon, supra note 124.
127. See Sarah Butrymowicz, When Charter Schools Fail, What Happens to the Kids?,
HECHINGER REP. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://hechingerreport.org/when-charter-schools-fail-whathappens-to-the-kids/ [https://perma.cc/7UWJ-MDKN].
128. See id.
129. See NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 117.
130. See supra notes 123–24.
131. See supra note 115.
132. See supra notes 123–25.
133. WASH. CONST. amend. IX.
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Washington State Territorial Legislature’s first acts.134 The legislation
provided numerous mechanisms to ensure the school uniformity and
equal access for students, including the establishment of a permanent
school fund, teacher certification requirements, and procedures to elect
local district directors.135 Despite promising legislation, the fragmented
system of districts established in the Act failed to promptly achieve the
widespread uniform system of education.136 Documents from this initial
phase are scarce and reflect the lack of centralized accountability.137
In 1877, the legislature enacted further legislation to unify the school
system and improve school laws.138 The resulting education system bore
many features that Washington residents may associate with modern
public schools.139 The law established a general course of study for
common school students and established a Territorial Board of
Education (the Board).140 The law gave the Board the power to ensure
uniform educational quality by adopting textbooks, setting school
governance rules, certifying teachers, and overseeing teachers, directors,
and superintendents.141
After statehood, the Washington State Supreme Court added
substantially to the understanding of the bounds of the common school
system with its 1907 opinion in School District No. 20, Spokane County
v. Bryan.142 In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Model Training School Act,143 a law passed by the Washington State
Legislature that provided for the establishment of a model training
school department in state normal schools.144 Another outgrowth of the
common school movement, normal schools were post-secondary teacher
training schools.145 Common school proponents emphasized that

134. Act of Apr. 12, 1854, 1854 Wash. Terr. Laws 319.
135. Id.
136. Beale, supra note 26, at 541.
137. Id.
138. Act to Provide a System of Common Schools for the Territory of Washington, 1877 Wash.
Terr. Laws 259.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909).
143. 1907 Wash. Sess. Laws 181.
144. Id. at 500, 99 P. at 28.
145. See, e.g., BRAIN L. FIFE, OLD SCHOOL STILL MATTERS 25–29 (2013) (describing the role of
uniform education for instructors in achieving uniform education for students).
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uniform teacher training would yield a uniform quality of education
throughout the state.146
Under Washington’s Model Training School Act, the normal schools
would include a “model training school” comprising students from local
districts.147 The model training school would operate as a primary
school, but student teachers would instruct the classes under the
supervision of instructors.148 Unlike common schools, which were
governed by an elected school board, an appointed board of trustees
supervised the normal schools.149 The Act directed the superintendent to
apportion funding for the model training school “out of the funds
available for the support of the common schools”150 based on the number
of pupils in attendance.151 The superintendent would apportion funds to
the model training schools based on the number of students enrolled.152
The Cheney School District challenged the funding mechanisms of
the Model Training School Act.153 The District sought an injunction in
Thurston County Superior Court to prevent the superintendent of public
instruction from apportioning funds to the model training department of
the normal school.154 The court granted the injunction and issued an
order directing that much of the Act relating to the model training school
department of normal schools and providing apportionment of funds
therefor was “unconstitutional and void.”155 On appeal, the State
identified four assignments of error.156 Each centered on the question of
whether the Model Training School Act required a diversion of the
common school fund in violation of the constitution.157
Resolution of the case required the Washington State Supreme Court
to determine whether the model training school was a common school
within the meaning of the state constitution.158 Cheney School District
argued that a common school is any school that “(1) [is] maintained at
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Bryan, 51 Wash. at 500, 99 P. at 28 (1909).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 501, 99 P. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 501, 99 P. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 502, P. at 29.
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public expense; [and] (2) provide[s] a course of elementary education for
children of all classes of people.”159 The Court rejected this definition,
holding that a common school within the meaning of the Constitution is
one “that is common to all children of proper age and capacity, free, and
subject to, and under the control of, the qualified voters of the school
district.”160
The Court next determined that model training schools were not
common schools under the constitution.161 The Court’s conclusion
centered on the model training school’s system of governance.162 It
noted that the principal was not an officer authorized to found a school
under the constitutional scheme.163 It also observed that the teachers in
the training school were not teachers within the meaning of the law,
which requires teacher certification.164 Most importantly, the Court
emphasized that the schools were not under “complete control” of the
voters “with the power to discharge [the officials] if they are
incompetent.”165 Because the model training school lacked these
essential features, the court held it could not qualify as a common school
under article IX, section 2.
In its opinion, authored by Justice Stephen Chadwick, the Court
clearly circumscribed the legislature’s power to allocate common school
funds: “To say that the Legislature can determine what institutions shall
receive the proceeds of the school fund, and that whatever they
determine to be entitled thereto becomes ipso facto a common school, is
begging the whole question, and annulling the constitutional
restriction.”166 Despite its opinion striking down the Model Training
School Act, the Court also left the door open to alternative funding
pathways: “It is not that the Legislature cannot make provision for the
support of a model training school, but in its attempt to do so, it has
made provision for it out of the wrong fund.”167
Bryan is a landmark decision in Washington’s education
jurisprudence. The opinion highlights the importance of legislative acts
159. Id.
160. Id. at 504, 99 P. at 30.
161. Id. at 503–04, 99 P. at 29–30.
162. Id. at 504, 99 P. at 30.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 504–05, 99 P. at 30 (quoting People ex rel. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum Soc. v.
Bd. of Educ., 13 Barb. 400, 410 (N.Y. 1851)).
167. Id. at 506, 99 P. at 32.
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funding schools by tethering them directly to the language of the
Washington State Constitution.168 The Court’s decision also solidified
the role of the judiciary in checking unconstitutional funding
mechanisms. In its opinion, the Court set a strict, formalistic tone and
made clear that appeals to convenience and efficiency would not be
sufficient to overcome the constitutional mandates regarding school
legislation.169 The Court acknowledged the State’s argument that the
schools met the same educational needs and were likely superior in
effectiveness to other common schools.170 Nonetheless, it invalidated the
law based on its holding that model training schools were not common
schools.
The Bryan decision also provides definitions to clarify two malleable
terms used in article IX, section 4. First, the court defined a common
school as one that is: (1) open to all students; (2) tuition-free; and (3)
subject to the control of voters.171 The third element is largely what
distinguishes common schools from other forms of public schools
established by the State.172 Thus, unlike universities and normal schools,
which operate under the control of an appointed board of trustees, voters
elect each member of the common school board.173 Second—though not
at issue in the case—the Bryan decision also provided some insight into
the meaning of term “uniform” as used in article IX, section 2.174 The
Court explained that a uniform system of common schools requires that
“every child shall have the same advantages and be subject to the same
discipline as every other child.”175
The Bryan Court’s formalistic analysis and its definition of common
schools have informed subsequent decisions in the realm of education.176
Its influence is most clearly found in the Court’s opinion in League of
Women Voters.177 The Bryan opinion has, therefore, shaped not only
constitutional jurisprudence regarding the requirements of article IX,
section 2, but also education legislation by providing guidance as to the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 501–02, 99 P. at 29–30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 502, 99 P. at 29.
See id.
Id.
See infra section III.A.
League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015).
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permissible scope of the legislature’s freedom to create new school
models or systems.
B.

Charter Schools in Washington State

The charter school debate in Washington extends over two decades.
Washington voters first considered Initiative 177, which would have
allowed for privately run, publicly funded schools, in 1996.178 This
legislation reflected the goals of the broader school choice reform
movement that had taken hold throughout the nation.179 That same year,
voters also considered Initiative 173, which would have directed the
legislature to issue vouchers allowing parents to use public education
funds to allow students to attend schools of the parents’ choosing.180
Both initiatives failed, with sixty-four percent of voters voting against
the charter school bill.181 Voter initiatives and legislative proposals
surfaced several times in the years following the 1996 initiative. In 2004,
the Washington State Legislature passed Engrossed Second Substitute
House Bill 2295 authorizing charter public schools.182 However,
Washington voters rejected the law using a veto referendum.183
Consequently, no charter legislation has been successful in Washington
until Initiative 1240 in 2012.184
1.

Voters Pass Initiative 1240 Authorizing Charter Schools in 2012

In 2012, Washington State voters passed the Washington Charter
School Initiative, known as Initiative 1240.185 Initiative 1240 permitted
178. See Dick Lilly, School-Choice Debate Lands on State Ballot—Initiative 177 for Independent
Schools; Initiative 173 for School Vouchers, SEATTLE TIMES, (Oct. 20, 1996),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961020&slug=2355318
[https://perma.cc/QD3C-FRMQ].
179. Id. (noting that the legislation would create schools “similar to the charter schools springing
up in other states”).
180. Id.
181. See LEAGUE OF EDUC. VOTERS FOUND., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND WASHINGTON STATE 1–2
(2011), http://educationvoters.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/White-paper-charter-schools-010511
-LEVF.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KKM-FUV9].
182. ch. 22, 2004 Wash. Sess. Law.
183. Washington Charter School Authorization, Referendum 55, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Charter_School_Authorization,_Referendum_55_(2004)
[https://perma.cc/X3KH-S24L].
184. See, e.g., H.B. 2295, 2004 Leg., 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004) (proposing charter
schools).
185. Initiative Measure No. 1240, §§ 202(1), 215(1), 220, 223(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 28A.710.020(1), 28A.710.150(1), 28A.710.220, 28A.710.230(1) (2014)).

14 - Gallina.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

WASHINGTON CHARTER SCHOOLS

3/29/2017 11:56 AM

391

the state to open up to forty public charter schools during the following
five years.186 Many of the requirements for charter schools specified in
Initiative 1240 reflected the common school requirements identified by
the Washington State Supreme Court in Bryan.187 Like traditional
district schools, charter schools under Initiative 1240 were free and open
to all students in the district.188 Initiative 1240 also required charter
schools to provide students a basic education189 in compliance with the
same academic standards as the district counterparts.190 To ensure
compliance, Initiative 1240 required charter schools to participate in the
same academic learning assessments administered in all common
schools.191 Finally, Initiative 1240 required all instructors to meet the
state teacher certification requirements.192
In many ways, the oversight mechanisms for charter schools also
resembled those for district schools. In district schools, a superintendent
monitors the schools.193 The superintendent is accountable to the locally
elected school board, which makes decisions regarding funding, staffing,
curricula, and other matters essential to steering the schools.194 Under
Initiative 1240, a charter school board undertook many of the duties of a
district’s superintendent.195 The board operated the school according to

186. Id. § 215(1).
187. See Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909).
188. Initiative Measure No. 1240 § 101(n)(iv). Students must apply to the charter school, but
unlike many private schools the student does not need to compete for a spot at the school. WASH.
REV. CODE § 28A.710.050(1) (2014). If more students want to attend a specific charter school than
the school can accommodate, enrollment is determined by a random lottery. Id. § 28A.710.050(3).
189. Under Washington State law, a basic education does not have a static definition but is one
which “provide[s] students with the opportunity to become responsible and respectful global
citizens, to contribute to their economic well-being and that of their families and communities, to
explore and understand different perspectives, and to enjoy productive and satisfying lives.” WASH.
REV. CODE § 28A.150.210.
190. Id. § 28A.710.040(2)(b).
191. The superintendent establishes these assessments, which measure academic proficiency
throughout elementary, middle, and high school. Id. § 28A.655.070. The results are used to inform
educational instructional practices and to identify students who have not mastered the academic
requirements appropriate for their grade. Id.
192. Id. § 28A.410.025. This requirement appears to be a direct response to the Court’s holding in
Bryan, as charter legislation in most states does not require instructors to possess education-specific
credentials. See generally Charter Schools—Do Teachers in a Charter School Have to be Certified?,
EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STS. (June 2014), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1425
[https://perma.cc/TDG2-5UBL].
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.040(1).
194. Id. § 28A.320.015.
195. Id. § 28A.710.030.
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the terms of its charter contract196 and was accountable to its charter
school authorizer.197 A charter school board also provided many of the
same functions as a district school board.198 In addition, authorizers were
required to develop and enforce policies regarding student performance,
school oversight, financial management, and charter renewal.199 Unlike a
district school board, however, local voters do not necessarily elect a
charter school authorizer.200 Although district school boards could serve
as authorizers, Initiative 1240 also granted the Washington Charter
School Commission the authority to establish charter schools anywhere
in the state.201
Initiative 1240 directed the superintendent to determine the
allocations using the same school funding scheme used to determine
funding for district schools.202At the state level, the funding for charter
schools under Initiative 1240 was almost identical to that required for
traditional district schools.203 Like district schools, charter schools would
receive allocations from the superintendent of public instruction.204
Although Initiative 1240’s funding allocation process was identical to
that used for district schools, the process by which charter schools
utilized that funding differed.205 Initiative 1240 permitted charter schools
to spend funding in accordance with the school’s charter contract.206
A final point of difference between charter and district schools under
Initiative 1240 was the requirement for annual reports.207 Under
Initiative 1240, the state Board of Education was required to issue an
annual report on the state’s charter schools to the governor, the

196. Id. The charter contract is the authorizing document that permits charter schools to operate.
Id. § 28A.710.010(4). Under the contract, the charter school agrees to provide basic educational
services and to conform to the academic and operational performance expectations set out in the
contract. Id. § 28A.710.160.
197. Id. § 28A.710.100. Two entities can authorize charter schools: the charter school
commission and local school district boards that have been approved as authorizers by the
commission. Id. § 28A.710.080.
198. See id. § 28A.710.100.
199. Id. In addition, authorizers solicit and evaluate charter applications, execute charter contracts
with each charter school, and monitor schools in accordance with charter contracts. Id.
200. Id. § 28A.710.080.
201. Id. § 28A.710.180(1).
202. Initiative Measure No. 1240, § 222.
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.220.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 28A.710.250(2).
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legislature, and the general public.208 The report would include a
comparison of charter school student performance across academic,
ethnic, and economic lines;209 the Board’s assessments of the charter
schools’ successes and areas for improvement;210 and a report on the
sufficiency of charter school funding and charter school efficiency in
utilizing those funds.211
2.

The Washington State Supreme Court Holds Initiative 1240
Unconstitutional in League of Women Voters of Washington v.
State

After voters passed Initiative 1240 in 2012, eight charter schools
opened in the state.212 One of the schools, First Place Scholars, faced
public scrutiny because the school received $200,000 in excess state
funding due to inaccurate reports of staff and student enrollment
numbers.213 Unlike First Place Scholars, which operated for nearly three
decades as a private school, the seven other charter schools that opened
following Initiative 1240 were entirely new.214 As students in Seattle,
Tacoma and Spokane enrolled in the newly opened charter schools,
parent and community activists mounted a legal opposition to the charter
school law.215
In 2013, community members and organizations, including League of
Women Voters of Washington and El Centro de la Raza, filed a suit in
King County Superior Court seeking to halt implementation of the
Initiative.216 They sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. John Higgins, Wave of Charter Schools Debuts With All Seats Filled, SEATTLE TIMES, (Aug.
17, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/wave-of-charter-schools-debutswith-all-seats-filled/ [https://perma.cc/9MSQ-NG9Q] (noting that, in addition to the existing charter
school in Seattle, three schools planned to open in Seattle, three planned to open in Tacoma, and
two planned to open in Spokane).
213. John Higgins, State’s First Charter School Was Overpaid $200,000, SEATTLE TIMES, (Sept.
21, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/audit-comes-down-hard-on-statesfirst-charter-school/ [https://perma.cc/45Y9-JXF4].
214. See Higgins, supra note 212.
215. See Brian M. Rosenthal, Coalition’s Suit Challenges State’s Charter-Schools Law, SEATTLE
TIMES, (Jul. 3, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/coalitionrsquos-suit-challengesstatersquos-charter-schools-law/ [https://perma.cc/8R8F-FAYF].
216. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief at *3–8, League of Women Voters
of Washington v. State, No. 13-2-24997-4 SEA, 2013 WL 11109512 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 12,
2013).
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Initiative and a declaratory judgment that the Initiative violated the
Washington State Constitution.217 After both sides moved for summary
judgment, the trial court found that charter schools met the constitution’s
uniformity requirement but were not common schools because they were
not subject to local voter control.218 Consequently, the trial court held
that the Initiative unconstitutionally diverted funds to non-common
schools.219 However, the court also found that the funding provisions
were severable, and held that the Initiative was otherwise
constitutional.220
On direct appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court that the Initiative improperly designated charter schools as
“common schools” and unconstitutionally diverted funds from the
common school fund.221 The majority based much of its opinion on its
1909 Bryan holding.222 Because charter schools are governed by
appointed, rather than elected, members of the charter school board, the
Court reasoned that charter schools are not subject to local voter
control.223 As a result, charter schools could not be common schools
under the definition established in Bryan, and therefore could not receive
constitutionally protected common school funds.224
Notably, the Court held that charter schools could not receive any
funds from the general fund money—even from those accounts not
allocated for the use of common schools.225 The Court reasoned that the
Washington State Constitution prohibits non-common schools from
receiving any funds dedicated for the use of common schools.226 On its
face, this is a relatively narrow restriction. The only monies
constitutionally dedicated for the exclusive use of common schools are
the common school fund, the common school construction fund, and the
state tax for common schools.227 However, case law has expanded this
217. Id.
218. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 13-2-24997-4 SEA, 2013 WL 11109512, at
*3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013).
219. Id. at *4–5.
220. Id. at *5.
221. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 397–98, 355 P.3d 1131,
1133–34 (2015).
222. Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909).
223. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 405, 355 P.3d at 1137 (citing Bryan, 51 Wash. at
504, 99 P. at 30).
224. Id. at 406–07, 355 P.3d at 1138–39.
225. Id. at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139.
226. Id.
227. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
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category to include all money “allocated to the support of the common
schools” regardless of its origin.228 A majority of school funding comes
from the basic education allocation.229 Because the legislature
appropriated the basic education allocation for the use of common
schools, the Court ruled that it could not then redirect those funds to
charter schools.230 The Court reasoned that, because the state
commingled the unrestricted funds in the general fund with restricted
property levy revenue, there was no way to ensure that only common
schools had access to the levy funds.231
Prohibiting charter schools from receiving even unrestricted funds
from the general fund was fatal to Initiative 1240.232 Without access to
any funding, charter schools could neither open nor operate.233 While the
Court as unanimous in its holding that charter schools were not common
schools, it split on the issue of severability. The majority held that the
funding provisions were not severable, reasoning that the funding
provisions were central to Initiative 1240’s approval and vital to its
operation.234 Because the funding provisions affected an unconstitutional
diversion of common school funds, the Court invalidated Initiative 1240
entirely.235
The Court’s initial slip opinion also contained a footnote briefly
addressing the argument that Initiative 1240 violated the article IX
uniformity requirement:

228. State ex rel. State Bd. for Vocational Educ. v. Yelle, 199 Wash. 312, 316, 91 P.2d 573, 575
(1939).
229. OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, WASHINGTON STATE EDUCATION
FUNDING 101 (2015), http://www.k12.wa.us/LegisGov/2015documents/2015LegislativePackage
.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAE6-VUSY].
230. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 406, 355 P.3d at 1138.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 412, 355 P.3d at 1141.
233. Id. (“Without a valid funding source the charter schools envisioned in I–1240 are not
viable.”).
234. The test for severability is “whether the unconstitutional provisions are so connected to the
remaining provisions that it cannot be reasonably believed that the legislative body would have
passed the remainder of the act’s provisions without the invalid portions.” Id. at 411–12, 355 P.3d at
1140–41 (citing Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 197, 949 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1998); State v.
Crediford, 130 Wash. 2d 747, 760, 927 P.2d 1129, 1135 (1996)). The Court found the funding
sources were so intertwined with the rest of the Act that voters would not have passed the Act
without the funding provisions. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 406, 355 P.3d at 1138.
Thus, although the Act contained a severability clause, the Court concluded the invalid portions
were not severable. Id.
235. Id.
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Further, under Bryan the absence of local control by voters
would
also
violate
the
article
IX
uniformity
requirement. . . . Bryan held in part that the legislation in
question was invalid because ‘its operation . . . would break the
uniformity of the common school system,’ that is, by having
students instructed by uncertified teachers. Here, the uniformity
of the common school system is similarly broken in that the
Charter School Act eliminates the local voter control that is a
hallmark of common schools, thereby resulting in different
(nonuniform) governance for charter schools as compared to
common schools.236
The Court confined its discussion of the uniformity requirement to the
common school system under Bryan. It did not address the broader
import of the mandate on charter schools within the public system as a
whole.
The Court declined to elaborate on its position regarding the article
IV general and uniform mandate, explaining, “we do not further address
[Initiative 1240’s] article IX uniformity failings or the parties’ other
arguments because we find the invalidity of the Act’s funding provisions
as discussed herein to be dispositive.”237 Following a motion for
reconsideration, the Court ultimately struck the footnote entirely, leaving
the issue of article IX uniformity entirely untouched in the final,
published opinion.238
3.

The 2016 Legislature Passes the Charter Public School Act
Authorizing Charter Public Schools

In 2016, the 64th Legislature passed the Charter Public School Act
(CPSA) in response to the Court’s decision in League of Women
Voters.239 The CPSA retains much of framework for creating, governing,
and operating charter schools from Initiative 1240.240 However, the reenacted provisions establish a framework for charter schools that
236. League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11 n.10 (Wash.
Sept. 4, 2015) (citation omitted).
237. Id.
238. Order Changing Opinion and Denying Further Reconsideration, League of Women Voters
of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015) (No. 89714-0).
239. Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207. The bill became law as
Chapter 241, Laws of 2016 without the governor’s signature. See John Higgins et al., Gov. Inslee
Grudgingly Allows Charter Schools to Survive, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/charter-school-bill-likely-to-become-law/
[https://perma.cc/4AAW-YP36].
240. Id. §§ 101–38.
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operates separately from common schools.241 Instead, charter schools are
defined as public schools that offer an alternative to common schools.242
As in Initiative 1240, charter schools operate according to a charter
contract that establishes the specific operation requirements and
performance standards for each individual charter school.243 As public
schools, charter schools remain tuition-free and open to all children.244
Charter schools remain subject to the charter school board, the
authorizing agency, and the Washington State Charter Commission.245
The CPSA retains the dual-authorizer structure that permits charter
school founders to submit charter school proposals to either participating
local districts or the Washington Charter School Commission.246
Likewise, charter schools remain exempt from all rules and statutes
governing common schools with the exception of certain laws
enumerated in the CPSA or the charter contract.247 The Washington
Charter School Commission also retains the general structure outlined in
the Initiative, with the exception that it now comprises eleven members
rather than nine.248 The two additional members are the Superintendent
of Public Instruction or his or her designee and the chair of the State
Board of Education.249 For the remaining nine members, appointment
qualification and term length remain the same as those established in
Initiative 1240.250
While much of the CPSA resembles Initiative 1240, the legislation
includes substantial revisions meant to directly address the Court’s
concerns in League of Women Voters. For example, the CPSA makes
charter schools ineligible to receive local school levy revenues or funds
from the Common School Construction Fund.251 Charter schools must
locate funding entirely from unrestricted sources because the legislation

241. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.020 (2014).
242. Id.
243. See id. § 28A.710.040.
244. Id. § 28A.710.020.
245. See Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207, §§ 103, 104, 107.
246. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.710.020(3), 28A.710.160.
247. Id. § 28A.710.040(3).
248. Id. §§ 28A.710.070(2)(i)–(iii).
249. Id.
250. See Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207, § 107 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.070) (black-line illustrates relatively few changes to this section).
251. Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207, § 122(2)–(9) (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.220).
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places the schools plainly outside the common school system.252 Under
the CPSA, the legislature will appropriate amounts to support charter
schools from the Washington Opportunity Pathways Account.253 From
this lump sum, the superintendent of public instruction must calculate
and distribute funding to charter schools “equitably with state funding
provided for other public schools.”254 This includes adherence to the
general apportionment as well as supplementary funds based on state
formulas.255 While charter schools may not receive funding from the
Common School Construction Fund, they may receive construction
funds from other sources.256 Charter schools are eligible to apply for
grants to the same extent as district schools.257
The CPSA includes remedial measures intended to mitigate the
consequences of the Court’s opinion in League of Women Voters. The
CPSA provides all parties who entered into a contract under Initiative
1240 the opportunity to re-execute the contracts upon substantially the
same terms and for the same duration.258 Early drafts of the CPSA also
required the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to
reimburse charter schools for the loss of state revenue for the 2015–2016
school year.259 After the ruling in League of Women Voters, Governor
Inslee authorized charter schools to operate under the supervision of
district schools as alternative learning experiences.260 An alternative
learning experience is a course primarily characterized by its location
away from the classroom setting.261 Because the alternative learning
252. See League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131
(2015) (holding that commingling of common school funds with the general funds makes it
impossible “to ensure that these dollars are used exclusively to support the common schools”); Sch.
Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 505, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909) (holding only common
schools can receive common school funds).
253. Unlike the general fund, the Washington Opportunity Pathways account is a dedicated
account for revenue from the state lottery. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.20A.892. Revenue from the
opportunity pathways account is statutorily restricted to eleven education-related programs. Id.
§ 28B.76.526.
254. Id. § 28A.710.280.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 28A.710.230(1).
257. Id.
258. Id. § 28A.710.230(3).
259. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, WASH. STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, E2SSB
6194 BILL ANALYSIS 5 (2015), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2015-16/Pdf/Bill%20Reports
/House/6194-S2.E%20HBA%20ED%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFR4-5RBG].
260. See Ann Dornfeld, Washington Charter Schools Get Creative to Keep State Funding,
KUOW.ORG (Jan. 5, 2016), http://kuow.org/post/washington-charter-schools-get-creative-keep-state
-funding [https://perma.cc/4F6L-E7KY].
261. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-121-182.
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experience funding did not cover the entire expense of charter-school
operating costs for the 2015–2016 school year, early drafts required the
legislature to reimburse charter schools for the difference between
expected and received funding for that school term.262 However, this
provision did not make it into the final legislation.263
The CPSA also creates new funding provisions for other educational
programs outside the common school system.264 The Court’s holding
regarding commingling of the general fund created problems not just for
charter schools, but for all education programs outside the common
school system.265 This includes the National Guard Youth Challenge
Program, the Early Entrance Program or Transition School Program at
the University of Washington, education programs for juvenile inmates
of the Department of Corrections, education center programs, the
Washington Community Learning Center Program and the state-tribal
education compact programs.266 Under the CPSA, each of these
programs received funding through the Washington Opportunity
Pathways Account.267
III. ARTICLE IX AND THE GENERAL AND UNIFORM
REQUIREMENT
The legislature sought to address the Court’s primary constitutional
objections to Initiative 1240 by removing charter public schools from the
common school system and making them ineligible to receive restricted
funds under the CPSA.268 However, because it purports to place charter
schools within the public school system, the charter legislation must be
consistent with the broader constitutional mandate that the legislature
provide for a “general and uniform system of public schools.”269 The
Washington State Supreme Court has not yet considered whether charter
schools fit within the general and uniform system of public schools.270 In
262. See S.B. Rep. 6194 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201516/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/6194%20SBA%20WM%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M7N-BQJS].
263. See Act effective April 3, 2016, ch. 241, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 1207.
264. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.76.526 (2014).
265. Cf. id.; League of Women Voters of Washington v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 409, 355 P.3d
1131, 1139 (2015).
266. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.76.526.
267. See id.
268. See League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139.
269. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
270. In a recent ruling granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, King County Superior Court Judge
John Chun noted:
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the handful of decisions purporting to define the scope of this
requirement, the Court appears to focus on uniformity of the schools
themselves, rather than on the system by which the state administers
those schools.271 However, because these opinions contemplate the
scope of the “general and uniform” requirement in relation only to
common schools, it is not yet clear how Washington courts would apply
the mandate to charter schools.
In addition to the Washington State Supreme Court cases directly
interpreting the general and uniform mandate in article IX, section 2,
other cases interpreted similar phrases found elsewhere in the
Washington State Constitution provide some insight into its operation.272
Unlike the cases emphasizing the substantive uniformity of the common
school system, cases applying the phrase to other contexts generally
construe the terms as operating to require a uniform system of laws or
procedures without regard to the substantive outcome.273 Likewise, cases
interpreting similar or identical clauses in other state constitutions are
also instructive.274 These cases also reveal that other state supreme
courts have not interpreted the general and uniform mandate as requiring
uniform schools, but only as requiring a uniform system of laws and
procedures governing those schools.275
A.

The Washington State Supreme Court has Interpreted the Article
IX “General and Uniform” Requirement Only in the Context of
Common Schools

The Washington State Supreme Court has not yet considered whether
legislation providing for charter schools can meet the “general and
Plaintiffs contend that the Act violates article IX, section 2’s uniformity requirement for the
public school system. Their argument, however, conflates common schools with public
schools. Common schools are but one component of the public school system, yet Plaintiffs’
argument attempts to measure charter schools against common schools rather than the broader
public school system . . . Thus, the uniformity analysis requires measurement against the public
school system and not solely common schools.
Memorandum Opinion & Order Re: Summary Judgment, El Centro De La Raza v. Washington, No.
16-2-18527-4 SEA (Feb. 17, 2017).
271. See Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 (2009);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (1978);
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 729, 530 P.2d 178, 202 (1974),
overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97; Sch. Dist. No. 20,
Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909).
272. See infra section III.B.
273. See id.
274. See infra section III.C.
275. See id.
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uniform” mandate in article IX, section 2. A handful of cases purport to
define the mandate, but they did so only in the context of common
schools.276 Notably, in its original opinion in League of Women Voters,
the Washington State Supreme Court initially noted in dictum that
charter schools did not satisfy the requirement.277 However, the Court
deleted the footnote in its amended opinion.278 The scope and
implications of the “general and uniform” mandate, therefore, remain
unsettled.
Bryan is the earliest case analyzing the general and uniform
mandate.279 In that case, the Court described a general and uniform
system as one in which all students are “subject to the same discipline as
every other child.”280 The Court’s discussion appeared in dictum as the
case was resolved on other grounds—namely the fact that the statute
unconstitutionally diverted common school funds.281 The Court appeared
to consciously limit its discussion to the requirements of the mandate on
the common school system: in addressing Spokane County’s arguments,
the Court noted, “the argument of counsel emphasizes the fact that in its
operation the act of 1907 would break the uniformity of the common
school system.”282
More recent cases interpreting the general and uniform mandate in the
context of article IX, section 2 include a handful of decisions regarding
school funding.283 In the 1970s, two cases discussed the mandate in the

276. See Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210, 167 Wash. 2d at 527, 219 P.3d at 948; Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1 of King Cty., 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97; Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417, 84 Wash. 2d
at 729, 530 P.2d at 202; Bryan, 51 Wash. at 504, 99 P. at 30.
277. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11 n.10 (Wash. Sept. 4,
2015).
278. Order Changing Opinion and Denying Further Reconsideration, League of Women Voters of
Wash., 184 Wash. 2d, 355 P.3d 131 (2015) (No. 89714-0).
279. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 504, 99 P. at 30.
280. Id. at 502, 99 P. at 29. Notably, this language is nearly identical to the definition advanced in
the 1890 North Carolina case City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586, 589 (1890).
281. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 504, 99 P. at 30.
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948
(2009) (challenging disparate school employee salary figures under the Basic Education Act as
unconstitutional); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d 71,
97 (1978) (seeking a declaration that the State’s reliance on special excess levy funding for
discharging its duty to provide for the education of resident children was unconstitutional);
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 729, 530 P.2d 178, 202 (1974),
overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97 (challenging
constitutionality of school finance system).
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context of taxation.284 In Northshore School District v. Kinnear,285 the
Court held that a tax-credit program implemented by the Department of
Revenue intended to achieve equality in school support was consistent
with the objectives of article IX, section 2.286 The Court also held that
using local school levies to fund common schools did not violate the
general and uniform mandate despite the fact that it resulted in disparate
funding sources for schools in different districts.287 The Northshore
Court defined a general and uniform system as “one in which every child
in the state has free access to certain minimum and reasonably
standardized
educational
and
instructional
facilities
and
288
opportunities.”
Four years later, the Court overruled Northshore,
holding that “compliance with [the Washington State Constitution] can
be achieved only if sufficient funds are derived, through dependable and
regular tax sources, to permit school districts to provide a ‘basic
education’ . . . in a ‘general and uniform System of public schools.’”289
Most recently, in Federal Way School District No. 210 v. State,290 the
Court held that funding disparities for staff salaries did not violate the
general and uniform mandate.291 The Court explained, “the provision
requires uniformity in the educational program provided, not the
minutiae of funding.”292
In each of these cases, the Court discussed the general and uniform
mandate, but only in the context of the common school system.
Although the Bryan Court explicitly constrained its definitions of
“general and uniform” to the common schools, the definitions advanced
by the Court in Northshore and Federal Way arose from challenges to
laws concerning the common school system. Consequently, there is a
relative lack of authority on the interpretation of the term as it applies
outside the common school context.

284. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 71; Northshore, 84 Wash. 2d at
685, 530 P.2d at 178.
285. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
286. Id. at 729, 530 P.2d at 202.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2).
290. 167 Wash. 2d 514, 219 P.3d 941 (2009).
291. Id. at 527, 219 P.3d at 948.
292. Id.
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Other Interpretations of the Term “Uniform” in the Washington
State Constitution Conflict with the Substance-Based Definitions
Articulated in the Common School Context

The term “uniform” appears in several provisions throughout the
Washington State Constitution. In nearly every instance, it appears in the
form of a mandate to the legislature to establish laws, rules or
procedures.293 However, outside the common school context, courts
generally treat the term uniform as a procedural standard rather than a
substantive guideline.294 While the independent context of each
constitutional provision must be taken into account, these conflicting
interpretations provide important insight into the original understanding
of the term as it was used in the constitutional scheme. Taken together,
these cases illustrate that the substance-based interpretations advanced in
the common school cases are an exception to the Court’s general
treatment of uniformity as a procedural requirement.
Early cases interpreting the uniformity mandate illustrate the Court’s
procedure-based interpretation.295 In 1890, the Washington State
Legislature passed a statute authorizing the commissioners of each
county to appoint county deputies and fix the salaries of such officers as
the needs of the county required.296 Article XI, section 5, requires the
legislature to provide “by general and uniform laws” for the election and
compensation of all county officers.297 Mr. Nelson, a resident taxpayer
of Clallam County, challenged the statute, arguing that the legislature’s
delegation of power to the individual counties and the resulting inter-

293. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (“The legislature shall establish a system of county government,
which shall be uniform throughout the state except as hereinafter provided, and by general laws
shall provide for township organization . . . .”); id. art. XI, § 5 (“The legislature, by general and
uniform laws, shall provide for the election in the several counties of boards of county
commissioners, sheriffs, county clerks, treasurers, prosecuting attorneys and other county, township
or precinct and district officers, as public convenience may require, and shall prescribe their duties,
and fix their terms of office.”); id. art. IV, § 24 (“The judges of the superior courts, shall from time
to time, establish uniform rules for the government of the superior courts.”); id. art XII, § 19 (“The
legislature shall, by general law of uniform operation, provide reasonable regulations to give effect
to this section.”). Notably, art. XII, § 19, which relates to regulation of telephone and telegraph
companies, states: “The legislature shall, by general law of uniform operation, provide reasonable
regulations to give effect to this section.” WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 19 (emphasis added). This
language strongly suggests the term uniform applies to procedure, and not substance.
294. See infra section III.C.
295. Nelson v. Troy, 11 Wash. 435, 39 P. 974 (1895); State v. Fleming, 88 Wash. 583, 153 P. 347
(1915).
296. Nelson, 11 Wash. at 437, 39 P. 975.
297. Id. at 436–37, 39 P. 974–75 (citing WASH. CONST. art. XI § 5).
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county variation in deputy salaries “destroy[ed] the uniformity of the
operation of law.”298
In support of this argument, Mr. Nelson cited the California case of
Dougherty v. Austin,299 in which the California Supreme Court had
invalidated similar legislation as violating an analogous “general and
uniform” mandate in the California State Constitution.300 In that case,
the California Supreme Court held that the law was not general in nature
and uniform in operation because it delegated the authority to hire
supporting staff to only certain classes of counties.301 The Washington
State Supreme Court rejected the case as inapposite because the
Washington legislation extended to all counties within the state.302
The Court also rejected Mr. Nelson’s substance-based argument that
the resulting inter-county salary variation destroyed the uniformity of the
laws, explaining that the fact that the law produced inter-county
variation in deputy salaries was not determinative of the issue.303
Instead, the Court assessed whether the statute operated in such a way
that “like conditions insur[ed] like results.”304 Because the deputyappointment statute was a “general provision . . . applicable to all classes
of counties,” the Court held that it satisfied the uniformity requirement
imposed by article XI, section 5.305
In State ex rel Maulsby v. Fleming,306 the Court again applied a
procedural analysis to hold that a law which facially discriminated
between counties throughout the state violated article XI, section 5.307
The statute at issue authorized prosecuting attorneys and justices of the
peace to assume the duty of coroners in all counties “except counties of
the first class.”308 The Court held that such facial discrimination violated
the uniformity requirement of the constitution: “It is plain that this is not
a uniform system . . . [for] the Legislature certainly has no right, under

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
29 P. 1092 (Cal. 1892).
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Nelson, 11 Wash. at 440, 39 P. at 976.
Id.
Id. at 446, 39 P. at 977.
Id. at 445, 39 P. at 977.
88 Wash. 583, 153 P. 347 (1915).
Id. at 586–87; 153 P. at 349.
Id. at 584, 153 P. at 348.

14 - Gallina.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

WASHINGTON CHARTER SCHOOLS

3/29/2017 11:56 AM

405

[article XI], to provide for officers in the counties of the first class which
are not provided for in other counties.”309
The Court’s opinion in Mount Spokane Skiing Corporation v.
Spokane County310 provides a more recent example of a Washington
court applying a procedural-based interpretation of the uniformity
mandate.311 In that case, Mount Spokane Skiing Corporation (Spokane
Skiing) entered into a twenty-year agreement with the State Parks and
Recreation Commission to operate an outdoor recreation facility in the
publicly owned Mount Spokane State Park.312 In 1990, a statecommissioned consultant concluded that Spokane Skiing was providing
“substandard” service.313 Based on these concerns, the Board of Spokane
County Commissioners created the Public Development Authority, a
public corporation, to manage the Mount Spokane State Park recreation
facility.314 Spokane Skiing filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Authority was an illegal entity and that RCW 35.21.730—which
authorized cities and counties to charter public corporations to
participate in federally assisted programs addressing the living
conditions in urban areas—violated the “general and uniform”
requirement in article XI, section 4.315
Spokane Skiing argued the different public corporations permitted
under RCW 35.21.730 violated article XI, section 4 by creating an
unconstitutional lack of uniformity.316 Under its interpretation of article
XI, section 4, the Constitution required “one system applicable alike in
all its parts and continuously operating equally in all of the counties of
the state.”317 The Court rejected Spokane Skiing’s definition, reasoning
that “[s]uch a strict requirement of ‘uniform’ fails to allow for the
discretion necessary to meet the particular needs of each county.”318
Instead, the Court employed a more procedure-focused approach:
“Under, RCW 35.21.730, all counties have the authority to create public
corporations. The statute further provides the proper purposes for which
309. Id. at 585, 153 P. at 348.
310. 86 Wash. App. 165, 936 P.2d 1148 (1997).
311. Id. at 180, 936 P.2d at 1155–56.
312. Id. at 169, 936 P.2d at 1150.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 169–70, 936 P.2d at 1151; see also WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
316. Mount Spokane Skiing Corp., 86 Wash. App. at 180, 936 P.2d at 1155–56.
317. Id. (The Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. Court relied on a definition taken from Coulter v.
Pool, 201 P. 120, 125 (Cal. 1921).).
318. Id. at 181, 936 P.2d at 1156.
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a corporation may be created. Such a system is uniform.”319 The Court
emphasized that the uniformity stemmed from the fact that “each county
has the authority [to create municipal corporations] available to it.”320 It
went on to explain that variation in the corporations created by the
county did not violate the Constitution because “[t]he manner in which
the county exercises this discretion should not be required to be strictly
uniform.”321
The procedure-based interpretation of the uniformity mandate applied
by the judiciary in Nelson, Fleming, and Mount Spokane Skiing is also
consistent with the text of the Washington State Constitution. Article
VII, section 1 states, “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and
shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.”322 This
constitutional recognition of inter-class variation is significant because it
recognizes the authority of the legislature to differentiate between
constitutionally recognized classes so long as laws have uniform
application within a class. Thus, outside the common school context, the
procedural nature of the term uniform in the Washington State
Constitution is plain.
C.

Other States with Similar Constitutional Language Have
Interpreted the Uniformity Requirement to Mandate Uniform Laws
but Not Uniform Schools

When the meaning of a term is not clear from the Constitution’s text,
courts look to other contemporaneous uses and interpretations.323
Washington framers borrowed liberally from the constitutions of other
states, including Oregon, California, and Wisconsin.324 Moreover,
because of the constitutional pluralism prevalent amongst most westernterritories turned states, it is common to find certain clauses lifted
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
323. Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 727, 530 P.2d 178, 201–02
(1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. V. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d
71, 97 (challenging constitutionality of school finance system); see also Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash.
2d 286, 291, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1959) (recognizing that when interpreting what the framers of
the Washington State Constitution meant by a “general and uniform system,” the Court should
consider the history of events preceding and contemporary to the adoption of the Washington State
Constitution).
324. James M. Dolliver, The Mind of the Founders: An Assessment of the Washington
Constitution of 1889, in WASHINGTON COMES OF AGE 135, 135 (David H. Stratton ed., 1992).
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directly from the constitutions of earlier colonial states.325 The phrase
“general and uniform system of free public schools” first appeared in the
North Carolina State Constitution drafted over a century earlier in
1776.326 Consequently, interpretations of analogous provisions in other
states’ constitutions may shed light on the original understanding of the
language used in the Washington State Constitution.
1.

Oregon

Before Washington’s territorial grant, Oregon governed much of the
land that is now Washington State.327 The first schools established in
present-day Washington State were established under Oregon’s
constitutional framework.328 Thus, the interpretation of Oregon’s
education provisions may be particularly indicative of the Washington
Constitution’s education mandates. Article VIII, section 3 of the Oregon
State Constitution charges the legislative assembly with the creation of
“a uniform, and general system of Common schools.”329 Like the
Washington Constitution, Oregon’s appears to contemplate a distinction
between public schools and common schools: “[t]he legislative assembly
shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform and general
system of common schools.”330
In the 1898 case of Harris v. Burr,331 the Oregon State Supreme Court
emphasized that its constitution delegated to the legislature the “plenary
power” to establish a system of public schools.332 In that case, Laura A.
Harris sued Sherwood Burr and others for denying her the privilege of
voting in a local school district election.333 The trial court found in Ms.
Harris’ favor, holding that Mr. Burr’s actions violated the legislative act
conferring upon women the right to vote at school district elections.334
After closely analyzing the Oregon Constitution, the Court concluded
that the Oregon Constitution did not prescribe the requirements for
325. See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument:
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 645–52 (1987).
326. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1776).
327. THOMAS WILLIAM BIBB, HISTORY OF EARLY COMMON SCHOOL EDUCATION IN
WASHINGTON 4 (1929).
328. Id.
329. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
330. Id.
331. 52 P. 17 (Or. 1898).
332. Id. at 20.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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school district officials or elections.335 As a result, the Court reasoned,
the state constitution vested discretion to regulate those matters in the
legislature.336
Perhaps because of the clear delineation of power to the legislature
recognized in Harris v. Burr, Oregon courts have not addressed a
challenge to charter schools on the basis that the schools violate the
uniform and general system of schools. In 1999, Oregon passed Senate
Bill 100337 authorizing charter schools. In the interceding decades, the
courts have not considered a constitutional challenge to the legislation
on the grounds that it violates the uniformity of the public school
system. The legislation has many of the same features as charter
legislation in Washington.338 It permits both local school districts and the
central State Board of Education to authorize charter schools.339 The
schools are open to all students, with over-enrolled schools determining
enrollment by a lottery.340 However, unlike Washington’s charter school
legislation, Oregon’s charter school legislation does not require all
teachers to hold state certifications.341 It also does not apply collective
bargaining agreements to non-district sponsored charter schools.342
2.

Colorado

While Oregon courts had no occasion to consider a uniformity
challenge to charter school legislation, the Colorado State Supreme
Court considered such an action in a 2009 case.343 Colorado enacted
charter school authorizing legislation in 1993.344 Under the original Act,
charter schools could be authorized only by local school district
approval.345 In 2004, the legislature amended the Act by adding a set of

335. Id.
336. See id.
337. Act of May 27, 70th Leg., 1999 Or. Laws ch. 200.
338. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 338.005–.165.
339. See id. § 338.005 (defining “sponsor” to include the board of the common school district or
the union high school district in which the public charter school is located, the State Board of
Education, or an institution of higher education).
340. Id. § 338.125(2)–(3).
341. See id. § 338.135 (this section defines employee requirements but does not include state
certification).
342. Id.
343. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. RE-2 v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 217 P.3d 918 (Colo. App.
2009).
344. Id.; Charter Schools Act, ch. 227, 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws 1051.
345. See Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 921.
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amendments known as Part Five.346 The Part Five amendments
established an alternative means of establishing charter schools by
creating an independent state agency, termed the Institute, authorized to
approve or deny applications for charter schools.347 The Part Five
amendments thus resulted in two types of charter schools: district charter
schools, which contract with the school boards of local districts; and
institute charter schools, which contract with the Institute.348
An Institute charter school is “a public school within the state, [that
is] unaffiliated with a school district.”349 Institute charter schools are
open to all children living within the State of Colorado, not just to
children residing within the district where the institute charter school is
physically located.350 The Colorado Department of Education funds the
institute charter schools based on the number of students in attendance
using the same formula is if the students attended a public school in the
local school district where the institute charter school is located.351
School districts are not, however, required to support institute charter
schools with locally raised funds.352
Three Colorado school districts and several individual plaintiffs
brought cases challenging the validity of the Part Five amendments. 353
The trial court consolidated the claims, granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the State on constitutional claims, and dismissed
the remaining claims with prejudice.354 Only one of the plaintiff school
districts, Boulder Valley, pursued an appeal.355 Although the motion for
summary judgment involved constitutional and non-constitutional
claims, Boulder Valley appealed only the ruling that Part Five does not
violate the Colorado Constitution.356 On appeal, the Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the statute was
constitutional.357

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id.; Act of June 3, ch. 358, 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1594.
Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 921.
See id.
Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-507(1)(b)).
Id.
Id. at 921–22 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-507(2)).
Id. at 922.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 928.
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One of Boulder Valley’s constitutional objections on appeal centered
on the following language in the Colorado Constitution: “The general
assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools
throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages
of six and twenty-one years may be educated gratuitously.”358
Boulder Valley argued that the plain meaning of this section required
the General Assembly to establish a “single uniform system of public
schools consisting of school districts . . . governed by locally elected
officials.”359 Boulder Valley argued that this duty prohibits the General
Assembly from establishing “a second and different system” governed
by unelected individuals.360
The Court rejected Boulder Valley’s argument, observing that nothing
in the text of the Colorado Constitution necessarily required the School
District’s restrictive reading: “We find no language in the provision that
engrafts these criteria onto the phrase ‘thorough and uniform
system.’”361 Relying on its previous interpretation in Lujan v. Colorado
State Board of Education,362 the Court explained that the provision is
satisfied if “thorough and uniform educational opportunities are
available through state action in each school district.”363 Consequently,
the Court held that the Institute charter schools established under Part
Five satisfied the uniformity mandate because the Institute schools were
equally available to all districts and students throughout the states.364
3.

North Carolina

Interpretations of nearly identical constitutional language in North
Carolina are also instructive. Early cases examining the North Carolina
provision suggest the term “uniform” implicates a procedural
requirement. That is, the term “uniform” requires laws of equal
application throughout the state. In the 1890 case City of Greensboro v.
Hodgin,365 the North Carolina Supreme Court explained the term
“general” meant “not local; not limited to one or more places or

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 928.
Id.
Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2).
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
Id. at 1025.
Boulder Valley, 217 P.3d at 928.
City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586 (N.C. 1890).
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localities in the state.”366 The term “uniform” required that the system
must operate in the same way throughout the state: “[T]he system cannot
be so regulated by statute as that it will apply and operate as a whole in
some places, localities and sections of the state, and not in the same, but
in different ways, in other places, localities, and sections.”367 The Court
then concluded that the purpose of the clause was to ensure that “all the
children within the prescribed ages, wherever they may reside in the
state, [have] the same opportunity to obtain the benefits of education in
free public schools.”368 Based on this language, the meaning of uniform
seems to apply to the procedural operation of the laws. Thus, the laws
established by the legislature to create the public school system must
operate with equal force upon all subjects within the class.
In a later case, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
state-funded high schools did not violate the state constitution even
though not all districts had established high schools.369 The Court
explained that “[t]he term ‘uniform’ here clearly does not relate to
‘schools[;]’ . . . the term has reference to and qualifies the word
‘system.’”370 The Court went on to explain that, although not all districts
had established a high school, “provision is made for establishment of
schools of like kind throughout all sections of the state and available to
all of the school population of the territories contributing to their
support.”371
The North Carolina Supreme Court relied on a parallel line of cases
interpreting the phrase in California. In the 1905 case Ex Parte
Sohncke,372 the California Supreme Court explained that the word
uniform in the constitution “does not mean ‘universal.’”373 Instead, it
requires “simply that the effect of general laws shall be the same to and
upon all persons who stand in the same relation to the law.”374 The
California and North Carolina Supreme Courts’ interpretations of the
general and uniform requirement place the emphasis on the legal
procedures by which schools are established and governed rather than on
the schools themselves.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 587.
Id.
Id.
Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Granville Cty., 93 S.E. 1001 (N.C. 1917).
Id. at 1002 (citing Ex Parte Sohncke, 82 P. 956 (Cal. 1905)).
Id.
82 P. at 956 (Cal. 1905).
Id. at 958.
Id.
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IV. THE SYSTEM OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ESTABLISHED BY
THE 2016 LEGISLATURE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
When the Washington State Legislature passed the Amended Charter
School Legislation, it did so against the backdrop of the 2015 litigation
in League of Women Voters. At the trial court level, the League asserted
two constitutional challenges. First, the League argued that charter
schools under the Initiative 1240 were not common schools and,
therefore, unconstitutionally diverted constitutionally restricted common
school funds.375 Second, the League asserted that the charter schools
under Initiative 1240 violated the Constitution’s requirement that the
system of public schools be “general and uniform.”376 Ultimately, the
Washington State Supreme Court invalidated Initiative 1240 on the
grounds that it unconstitutionally diverted common school funds but did
not decide the general and uniform issue.377 The amendments resulting
from the Court’s decision incorporated into the CPSA reflect both
reactive and proactive steps to bring charter schools within compliance
with the Constitution.378 These changes—coupled with an appropriately
framed understanding of the scope of the “general and uniform
mandate”—should be sufficient to bring the system of charter schools
within the general and uniform system of public schools required by the
Constitution.
A.

The Legislature Has Remedied the Constitutional Funding Issues
Identified in League of Women Voters of Washington v. State by
Removing Charter Schools from the Common School System

The CPSA specifically addresses the funding concerns identified by
the Court in League of Women Voters. The Court’s invalidation of the
funding mechanisms for charter schools dealt a fatal blow to the system
of charter schools established under Initiative 1240.379 Because the Court
unanimously found that charter schools under Initiative 1240 were not
common schools, the schools were, therefore, ineligible to receive
common school funds.380 Further, the majority’s reasoned that, because
375. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief at 3–8, League of Women Voters
of Wash. v. State, No. 13-2-24997-4 SEA, 2013 WL 11109512 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013).
376. Id.
377. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 184 Wash. 2d 393, 355 P.3d 1131 (2015).
378. See infra section IV.A.
379. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 412–13, 355 P.3d at 1141.
380. Id. at 409–10, 355 P.3d at 1139–40.
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common school funds were located in the general fund, there was “no
way to track restricted common school funds or to ensure that these
dollars [were] used exclusively to support the common schools.”381 This
co-mingling rationale effectively precluded charter schools from
receiving any monies stored in the general fund.382
The CPSA contains two substantive changes to remedy the
constitutional funding issues that existed under Initiative 1240. First, the
legislature removed charter schools from the common school system
entirely.383 In League of Women Voters, the Court held that charter
schools could not operate as common schools because they were not
subject to local voter control—a key feature of the common school
system.384 The legislature was, therefore, left with two possible
solutions: restructure charter schools to conform to the local control
requirement established by the Court in Spokane County v. Bryan, or
remove charter schools from the common school system entirely. It
chose the latter.385 Because charter schools are no longer within the
common school system, the schools are no longer subject to the Bryan
precedent requiring local voter control.386
Although removing charter schools from the common school system
addressed the Court’s objection to the charter school system’s lack of
voter control, it also means that charter schools cannot receive any
constitutionally restricted common school funds.387 The majority’s
reasoning rendered the entire general fund off-limits to charter schools
when prohibited the commingling of funds. The general fund is the
state’s largest fund and receives its revenues from taxes, revenues,
federal grants and revenues from licenses, permits and fees.388 To
overcome this restriction, the legislature chose to fund charter schools
under the CPSA from the Washington Opportunity Pathways Account
381. Id. at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139.
382. OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., A GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE BUDGET PROCESS 6 (2016),
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/reports/budgetprocess.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ2E-WD9K] [hereinafter
BUDGET GUIDE]. The general fund supports not only common schools, but also numerous other
public education programs. Taking the majority’s reasoning in League of Women Voters to its
logical extreme, many public education programs—including high schools and running start
programs—could lose funding.
383. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.010(5) (2014).
384. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 405, 355 P.3d at 1137.
385. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.010(5).
386. See Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 504, 99 P. 28, 30 (1909)
(identifying local voter control as an essential element of the common school system).
387. League of Women Voters, 184 Wash. 2d at 409, 355 P.3d at 1139.
388. See Budget Guide, supra note 382.
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(the Pathways Account).389 The Pathways Account is a separate account
that operates entirely independently from the general fund.390
Allocating funds from the Pathways Account is a constitutional
solution to the funding problems identified in League of Women Voters.
The Pathways Account does not contain any funds restricted for the use
of common schools, sidestepping any potential constitutional issues
arising from CPSA appropriations.391 Several other educational
programs that, like charter schools, are not subject to local voter control
receive funding from the Pathways Account.392 This suggests that local
voter control is not a prerequisite to receive funds from the Pathways
Account as it would be from the general fund.
B.

The CPSA Establishes a General and Uniform System of Charter
Schools

Parties challenging the CPSA began to challenge the new law in court
just days after its passage.393 If one or more of these cases reaches the
Washington State Supreme Court, the Court will likely be confronted
with the question of whether the CPSA satisfies the uniformity
requirement in article IX, section 2 of the Washington State
Constitution.394 Despite the Court’s footnote in its slip opinion in League
of Women Voters warning that the charter schools under Initiative 1240
likely violated the “general and uniform” requirement, if confronted with
a similar challenge to the CPSA, the Court should find that the law
satisfies the constitutional uniformity mandate. Although unsettled in the
educational context, cases interpreting the term “uniform” suggest the
term requires uniform operation of laws such that like conditions
produce like results under the law.395 The phrase does not appear to
require uniformity in the substantive results of the law so long as its
operation is uniform. Because the CPSA provides a uniform system for

389. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.270.
390. See BUDGET GUIDE, supra note 382.
391. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.76.526.
392. Id.
393. Complaint, El Centro de la Raza v. State, No. 16-2-18527-4 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 16,
2016). North Carolina also considered a similar suit challenging the validity of charter school
legislation under its nearly identical constitutional provision. See Sugar Creek Charter Sch., Inc. v.
State, 712 S.E.2d 730 (2011).
394. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, No. 89714-0, slip op. at 11, n.10 (Wash. Sept.
4, 2015).
395. See supra Part III.
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the establishment and administration of charter schools, the law satisfies
this procedural-based understanding of the uniformity requirement.
1.

The “General and Uniform Mandate” Does Not Require
Substantive Uniformity Between Schools; Rather, It Requires That
Each School Be Governed By General And Uniform Laws And
Procedures

The “general and uniform” mandate requires that each class of school
be governed by a general and uniform system of laws. It does not,
however, require that the schools within the public school be uniform to
one another. Washington cases considering the scope of the general and
uniform mandate seem to focus on the uniformity of the schools
themselves. However, the text of Constitution, the structure of the public
school system, and interpretations reflecting the common understanding
of the phrase all weigh in favor of a procedure-based interpretation.
The text of article IX, section 2 suggests that the general and uniform
requirement requires uniform procedures for the administration of public
schools. The meaning of the term “general” is relatively straightforward.
Contemporary dictionaries indicate that the term had two common
meanings: “of, for, or from the whole or all” or “not particular; not
local.”396 Both definitions are consistent with the common school
movement’s goal of creating schools open to all students throughout the
state regardless of income or locality.397 The use of the term “general”
elsewhere in the Washington State Constitution reflects the second
definition. Article XI, section 5 section requires legislature, “by general
and uniform laws,” to “provide for the election” of various county
officials.398 The section goes on to contrast general laws with “special”
or “private” laws.399 A special law is one that applies only to specific
things or persons within a class.400 By contrast, a general law applies to
all persons or things within a class.401 Following this logic, the term
“general” as used in article IX, section 2 requires the legislature to
establish a system of schools that is equally available to all students

396. See Beale, supra note 26, at 550 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 762 (2d ed. 1983)).
397. MURPHY & DUNN SHIFFMAN, supra note 35, at 52–55.
398. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
399. Id.
400. See Young Men’s Christian Ass’n v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 497–98, 154 P. 785, 785–86
(1916).
401. See id.
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throughout the state. Thus, a system is general if it is not limited to a
particular class or locality.
a.

The Text of Article IX, Section 2 Suggests the Uniformity
Requirement Mandates a Uniform System Rather than Uniform
Schools

While the term “general and uniform system” is open to at least two
interpretations, both the structure and the purpose of article IX, section 2
provide greater support for a procedural definition. Although not entirely
clear, the phrase “general and uniform” appears to modify the term
“system” rather than “schools.” Thus, it is the procedural system that
must be uniform rather than the substantive outcomes of the schools
themselves. This procedure-based interpretation is also consistent with
varied system of public schools described in the section.402 The
constitution contemplates a public school system including common
schools, high schools, and post-secondary vocational schools.403 A
procedure-based interpretation of uniformity permits this legislature to
effectuate this varied system of public schools by focusing on the
uniformity of the laws by which the public schools are administered
rather than the schools themselves.
The text of article IX, section 2 presents interpretative difficulties.
The sentence structure requiring a “general and uniform system of public
schools” obscures the referent, making it difficult to determine what,
exactly, must be general and uniform.404 Fundamentally, the phrase
“general and uniform” modifies the term “system.” 405 However, the term
“system” is further modified by the phrase “of common schools.”406 The
phrase is, therefore, susceptible to two different interpretations: one that
requires a general and uniform system for the administration of public
schools, and another that requires the schools themselves to be general
and uniform.
With respect to the term “general,” the two interpretations do not
substantially impact the meaning of the requirement. By their very
nature, the schools within the public school system are open to all
students of eligible age throughout the state.407 Therefore, whether the
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.010 (2014).
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term general operates on the term system or on the term schools, the
outcome will be the same. However, these alternative constructions
substantially affect the meaning of the uniformity requirement. On the
one hand, a uniform system would require a consistent set of laws,
regulations, and procedures by which the legislature administers public
schools. Thus, so long as the laws operate uniformly on all schools
within a class, the uniformity of the schools themselves is not
necessarily of constitutional import.408 On the other hand, if the mandate
requires uniformity amongst the schools, it would likely preclude most
alternative instructional schemes, including charter schools.409
The sentence immediately following the “general and uniform”
mandate suggests that the uniformity requirement is based in procedure
rather than substantive outcomes. It states, “[t]he public school system
shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools,
and technical schools as may hereafter be established.”410 This sentence
illustrates that the drafters contemplated a system comprising several
classes of schools. Common schools and high schools both provide the
type of education generally associated with modern district-based
schools. But the drafters also included in the public school system
normal schools and technical schools—post-secondary schools that offer
vocational training. As illustrated in Bryan, normal schools were
operated by a director and subject to the control of a board of trustees;
the schools operated in an entirely different manner than common
schools, and were not subject to voter control.411 However, the
Constitution plainly states that such schools are within the public school
system.412 This variation within the public school system, therefore,
supports an interpretation that focuses on the uniformity of the system
by which the schools are established rather than the schools themselves.
b.

If Applied Beyond the Common School Context, a Substantive
Interpretation of Uniformity Would Frustrate the System of Public
Schools Required by the Washington State Constitution

While a substantive interpretation of uniformity is a passable proxy
for a procedurally uniform system in the common school context,
applying the interpretation to non-common schools would severely
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See Mount Spokane Skiing Corp., 86 Wash. App. at 165, 936 P.2d at 1148.
Cf. Sch. Dist. No. 20, Spokane Cty. v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28 (1909).
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 P. 28.
See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
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restrict the legislature’s ability to establish other constitutionally
permissible classes of schools. Cases applying the mandate in the
context of common schools advanced definitions emphasizing
substantive uniformity despite the mandate’s language suggesting it
applies to the system rather than the individual schools. Although this
definition produces accurate results in the common school context, it
fails when applied to other forms of public schools. Because the cases
advancing a substantive interpretation of uniformity do so only in the
context of common schools, future courts can easily avoid these
problems by limiting the substantive definition to the common school
context and embracing a procedure-based definition when assessing
other systems of public schools.
For example, in Federal Way School District No. 210, the Court
stated that the Constitution required “uniformity in the educational
program provided.”413 Likewise, the Court in Bryan defined a general
and uniform system as one in which all students “shall have the same
advantages and be subject to the same discipline as every other child.”414
These definitions conflate the uniformity of the school system with the
uniformity of the schools themselves. In the context of common schools,
this subtle shift produces little, if any, difference in the analysis. The
common school movement’s focus on uniformity and equality means
that a properly administered system of common schools will be uniform
in both procedure and outcomes.415 Inconsistency in the schools
themselves necessarily signals a flaw in the system by which it is
administered.416 Thus, when analyzing common schools, definitions
based on substance, such as the one articulated in Federal Way School
District No. 210 requiring “uniformity in the educational program
provided,”417 function well as a screen for procedural deficits.
The Court’s opinion in Bryan—the only case considering the general
and uniform mandate involving both common and non-common
schools—self-consciously restrained its discussion of the general and
uniform mandate to the common school system. 418 When contemplating
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court noted that it would “break
413. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 (2009).
414. Bryan, 51 Wash. at 502, 99 P. at 29. Notably, this language is nearly identical to the
definition advanced in the 1890 North Carolina case City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586, 587
(1890).
415. Cf. FIFE, supra note 145.
416. Cf. id.
417. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210, Wash. 2d at 527, 219 P.3d at 948.
418. See Bryan, 51 Wash. at 498, 99 P. at 28.
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the uniformity of the common school system.”419 The Court’s word
choice is significant, because the case involved three different classes of
schools: common schools, normal schools, and model training
schools.420 Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that model
training schools could not be common schools because they differed
substantially in school governance, pupil selection, and teacher
qualifications.421 However, the Court’s opinion also makes clear that
these differences were not, in and of themselves, a constitutional
violation.422 On this point, the Court remarked, “It is not that the
Legislature cannot make provision for the support of a model training
school, but in its attempt to do so, it has made provision for it out of the
wrong fund.”423 Thus, although brief, the Court’s treatment of the
general and uniform mandate suggests that it viewed article IX, section 2
as requiring uniformity within the common school system, but not
necessarily across the public school system as a whole.
By constraining its application of the substantive interpretations of the
uniformity requirement, the Bryan Court avoided the problems that
would result from extending the definition to a non-common school. For
instance, the Constitution provides that vocational schools are part of the
public school system.424 However, vocational schools necessarily do not
share “uniformity in the educational program[s] provided.”425 Students
of auto mechanics must study a wholly different curriculum than
apprenticing electricians. This clearly illustrates that a substance-based
understanding of the uniformity requirement frustrates the system of
public education contemplated in article IX, section 2. The definitions
advanced by the Court in Northshore and Federal Way would provide
similarly unworkable results outside the common school system.
Certainly, the Constitution does not require that all public schools share
uniform educational programs as the Federal Way Court’s definition
suggests.426 If this were the case, seventh-graders and electricians alike
would read from the same textbooks and sit for the same examinations.

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 504, 99 P. at 30.
See id. at 500, 99 P. at 28.
See id. at 503, 99 P. at 29.
See id. at 506, 99 P. at 31.
Id. at 506, 99 P. at 31.
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wash. 2d 514, 527, 219 P.3d 941, 948 (2009).
Id.
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Such a result is plainly at odds with the public school system described
in article IX of the Washington State Constitution.427
Like the Bryan Court, Washington courts can avoid the problems
implicated by a substantive-based interpretation of uniformity with
relative ease. This is so because the cases in which the Courts advanced
such definitions did so only in the context of common schools, allowing
courts to distinguish when considering laws applying to non-common
schools. In Northshore, Seattle School District No. 1, and Federal Way,
the question before the Court concerned laws operating upon common
schools.428 Because each case dealt exclusively with common schools,
future courts may simply decline to extend the substantive-based
uniformity interpretation beyond this class of schools.
c.

A Procedure-Based Interpretation of the Uniformity Requirement
Is Consistent with the Judicial Interpretations of Uniformity in
Other Contexts

Cases interpreting the term uniform outside the common school
context indicate a procedural requirement rather than a substantive
standard. In Nelson v. Troy,429 State ex rel. Maulsby v. Fleming, and
Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, the Washington State
Supreme Court applied a procedure-based interpretation of the phrase
when interpreting other portions of the Washington State Constitution.
Likewise, courts interpreting similar constitutional provisions in other
states employed a procedure-focused analysis of the challenged laws.
Accordingly, a procedure-focused interpretation of the uniformity
mandate in article IX, section 2 is the most consistent with the judicial
consensus on the meaning of the term.
Washington Courts adopted a procedure-based interpretation when
analyzing the term “uniform” as used in article IX of the Washington
State Constitution. Early cases suggest the Court’s original
understanding of the term implicated an analysis of the operation of the
law, rather than the substantive outcomes. In Nelson v. Troy, the Court
427. Cf. FIFE, supra note 145 (discussing Horace Mann’s early reports on teacher training schools
and common schools); Washington Trade Schools and Vocational Schools, REAL WORK MATTERS,
http://www.rwm.org/washington-trade-schools/ [https://perma.cc/62X9-H2KN] (describing courses
of study including Dental and Mechanics).
428. See Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 688, 530 P.2d 178, 181
(1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 522, 585 P.2d
71, 97 (challenging constitutionality of school finance system); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash.
2d at 476, 585 P.2d at 71; Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210, 167 Wash. 2d at 527, 219 P.3d at 948.
429. 11 Wash. 435, 39 P. 974 (1895).
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held that a statute permitting each county to appoint and set a salary for
new deputies based on the county’s needs was constitutional because it
operated equally on all counties throughout the state.430 Likewise, in
State ex rel. Maulsby v. Fleming, the Court again used a procedure-based
analysis in its opinion holding a law that facially discriminated between
counties within the state violated article IX, section 4 of the Washington
State Constitution.431 The Court applied a similar analysis in reaching its
opinion in its more recent decision in Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v.
Spokane County.432 In that case, the Court held a statute permitting local
municipalities to charter private municipal corporations did not violate
the constitutional requirement that the “system of county
government . . . be uniform throughout the state.”433
The Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases interpreting the
term “uniform” in article IX closely tracks the procedure-based
interpretations advanced by other state courts interpreting similar
language in the education context. For example, the Colorado State
Supreme Court held that the state constitution’s requirement that the
legislature provide for a “thorough and uniform” public school system
was satisfied if “thorough and uniform educational opportunities are
available through state action in each school district.”434 This
interpretation places the Court’s analysis squarely on the laws and
procedures established by the legislature to provide for a system of
public education. Like the procedure-based definitions applied in
Nelson, Fleming, and Mount Spokane, the definition of uniformity
articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court permits variation amongst
the entities within the system, so long as the system itself operates
uniformly throughout the state.435 Similarly, in North Carolina, the State
Supreme Court explained that the Court explained the term “uniform” in
the phrase “a general and uniform system of public schools”
clearly does not relate to ‘schools’ . . . the term has reference to
and qualifies the word ‘system,’ and is sufficiently complied
with where, by statute or authorized regulation of the public
school authorities, provision is made for establishment of
schools of like kind throughout all sections of the state and
430. Id. at 445, 39 P. at 976.
431. State v. Fleming, 88 Wash. 583, 586–87, 153 P. 347, 348–49 (1915) (citing WASH. CONST.
art. 11, § 4).
432. 86 Wash. App. 165, 936 P.2d 1148 (1997).
433. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
434. Lujan v. Colo. Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo. 1982).
435. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025.
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available to all of the school population of the territories
contributing to their support.436
The prominence of the procedure-based interpretation of
constitutional uniformity requirements suggests courts generally
understand the term uniform as a standard applying to the laws and
systems established by the legislature. Both Washington and other state
courts were unconcerned with the uniformity of the resulting systems so
long as the laws by which the systems were established operated
uniformly throughout the state.437 Unlike the substantive-focused
applications of the uniformity requirement in common school cases, a
procedure-based interpretation applies to other forms of schools within
the public school system. For example, vocational schools need not
provide identical curricula or certification paths.438 But so long as the
procedures by which the schools are established, monitored, and
administered are uniform throughout the state, the system by which the
schools are established satisfies the procedural uniformity
requirement.439 Because the procedure-based application of uniformity
preserves the variety of schools comprising the public school system as
contemplated by the Constitution, Courts should reject the substantive
application of the uniformity provision in favor of the procedural based
application.
2.

The Charter School System Established Under CPSA Satisfies the
Constitution’s Procedure-Based Uniformity Requirement

If the Court uses a procedure-based interpretation of the uniformity
requirement in, it will very likely find that the CPSA provides sufficient
uniformity to withstand a constitutional challenge. As the Court
explained in Nelson, a uniform system is one in which “like conditions
insur[e] like results.”440 Because the CPSA applies on equal terms to all
charter schools operating throughout the state, charter school system
established under the CPSA meets the constitutional requirement for a
general and uniform system.
Under Initiative 1240, which attempted to define charter schools as
common schools, the operation of the laws on the common school
system was not uniform because the law treated similarly situated
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Granville Cty., 93 S.E. 1001, 1002 (N.C. 1917).
See supra section IV.B.1.
Washington Trade Schools and Vocational Schools, supra note 427.
See id.
Nelson, 11 Wash. at 437, 39 P. at 977.
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common schools differently depending on whether the school was
district- or charter- based.441 The CPSA cures this problem by placing
charter schools in a single class separate from common schools.442 Thus,
the CPSA must operate uniformly upon charter schools throughout the
state, but the uniformity of its operation is no longer tethered to the
treatment of common schools. The CPSA satisfies this standard by
providing uniform standards for school authorization, charter contract
terms, teacher certification, student achievement testing, and charter
review and renewal procedures.443
Notably, the authorization process established in the CPSA may
operate differently depending upon the county or district in which the
charter school is located. This is because the law’s dual-authorizer
system permits either local districts or the Washington Charter School
Commission to serve as authorizers.444 Individuals or organizations
seeking to establish a charter school in a charter-friendly district will
have access to two modes of authorization while schools in districts that
do not wish to participate in charter authorizers must use the Charter
School Commission.445 Despite this potential distinction in the
authorizing body, the laws will not operate differently because the
oversight mechanisms are the same whether the authorizer is a district or
the Charter School Commission.446 Thus, so long as all individuals and
organizations throughout the state have access to the ability to establish
schools within the charter schools system, the authorizing entity will not
interfere with the procedure-based uniformity of the system.
In Mount Spokane Skiing, the Court explained that the uniformity of a
system of laws was not determined by “[t]he manner in which [a] county
exercises its discretion” but by the fact that “each county has the
authority available to it.”447 The CPSA meets this procedure-based
standard. While not all counties or districts throughout the state will
necessarily choose to establish charter schools, the CPSA grants citizens
throughout the state the authority to do so. Similarly, although charter

441. Initiative Measure No. 1240 § 101(1)(m) (approved Nov. 6, 2012), https://wei.sos.wa.gov/
agency/osos/en/press_and_research/PreviousElections/2012/General-Election/Documents/I1240_complete_text.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJ4N-FYYH].
442. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.010 (2014).
443. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.710.010–.901.
444. Id. § 28A.710.080.
445. See id.
446. See id. § 28A.710.160.
447. Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane Cty., 86 Wash. App. 165, 181, 936 P.2d 1148,
1156 (1997).
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schools may differ in their curricula, goals, and mission statements, the
CPSA ensures that the schools are uniform in their establishment,
operation, and review. Consequently, despite the League of Women
Voters Court’s warning in its now-deleted footnote that charter schools
likely violated the uniformity of the common school system, the charter
school system established under the CPSA satisfies the uniformity
requirement in article IX, section 2 of the Washington State
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Legislation intended to establish public charter schools as an
alternative to district-based common and high schools has been the
subject of considerable scrutiny.448 In its most recent form,
Washington’s charter legislation has remedied the constitutional
deficiencies that led the Washington State Supreme Court to invalidate
Initiative 1240.449 Nonetheless, the political nature of charter schools
practically ensures the new legislation will be the subject of continued
litigation and constitutional objections.450 Because the CSPA creates a
separate class of charter public schools that are treated equally under the
laws,451 the legislation will likely withstand constitutional objections
based in the article IX general and uniform mandate.

448. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17 (describing community members’ reactions to the
Washington State Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling); John Higgins, State’s Largest Teacher’s Union
Plans to Sue Over Charter-School Law, SEATTLE TIMES (April 7, 2016 at 8:42 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/wea-preps-lawsuit-against-new-charterschools-law/ [https://perma.cc/482M-ZNUE] (detailing legal and political opposition to revised
charter school legislation); Lilly, supra note 178 (discussing early school choice legislation).
449. See supra section IV.A.
450. See Higgins, supra note 448.
451. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.020 (2014).

